A Guide to the Investigative and Enforcement
Provisions of the Uniform Securities
Act by Long, Joseph C.
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 37 | Issue 3 Article 3
Summer 6-1-1980
A Guide to the Investigative and Enforcement
Provisions of the Uniform Securities Act
Joseph C. Long
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Securities Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Joseph C. Long, A Guide to the Investigative and Enforcement Provisions of the Uniform Securities Act, 37
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 739 (1980), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol37/iss3/3
A GUIDE TO THE INVESTIGATIVE AND
ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS OF THE UNIFORM
SECURITIES ACT
BY JOSEPH C. LONG*
Enforcement of state securities acts' during the last ten years has
undergone a major renaissance.2 With this renaissance has come a grow-
* B.A. 1961; J.D. 1963, University of Missouri, Columbia; LL.M. 1972, University of
Virginia; Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma College of Law. The author is special
counsel for the North American Securities Administrator's Association and a Consultant to
the Oklahoma Securities Commission. As such he has been and will be involved in litigation
involving issues discussed in this article.
o Copyright by Joseph C. Long, 1980.
I Beginning with the passage of the first securities act in Kansas in 1911, state regula-
tion of securities pre-dates federal regulation by some 22 years. See J. MOFSKY, BLUE SKY
RESTICTIONS ON NEw BusINEss PROMOTIONs 5-14 (1971). (discussion of early state acts).
From approximately 1920 through the early 1930's there was intense interest in, and en-
forcement of, these early blue sky statutes. The large number of court decisions and attor-
ney generals' opinions which date from this period are evidence of this intense interest.
With the passage of the Securities Act of 1933 ('33 Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 ('34 Act), however, emphasis on enforcement of the securities laws passed to the fed-
eral government. State agency staffs during the period from 1935 through 1970 generally
shrank in size and contented themselves with performing the registration function under the
state acts.
2 A survey of the Security Exchange Commission (SEC) and the state commissions con-
ducted by the Oklahoma Securities Commission in conjunction with the North American
Securities Administrators Association (NASAA) supports the conclusion that enforcement
of the state securities acts has undergone a major rejuvenation. That survey reveals that in
1976 the states accounted for approximately sixty percent of the total criminal convictions
for violation of the securities laws. Of the 248 total convictions during the period, 141 were
state convictions. The original data from this 1977 survey is on file at the offices of the
Oklahoma Commission. While the number of convictions is pitifully small, the increased
interest by the state agencies in enforcement matters is apparent.
The cause for this increased state enforcement activity is difficult to isolate. To some
degree, the increased activity is simply a product of the heightened awareness of the general
population concerning securities matters which arose from the explosion in securities litiga-
tion in the 1960's. In large measure, however, the increased activity stems from a realization
by the state agencies that the SEC is not well-equipped to deal with the unusual or exotic
securities which corporations marketed during the 1970's as investor confidence in the more
traditional common stocks and bonds wained. See generally Long, The Naked Commodity
Option Contract as a Security, 15 WnLiAM & MARY L. REV. 211 (1973); Long, An Attempt
to Return "Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream of Securities Regulation, 24 OKLA. L.
Rv. 135 (1971)[hereinafter cited as Long, Mainstream]. As a result, a group of young state
administrators realized that if any protection was to be afforded the residents of their states
the state agencies would have to provide it.
The increased state enforcement of local securities laws, however, has not yet alleviated
the problem of securities fraud. A recent survey of 28 state securities administrators con-
ducted by the General Accounting Office lead to an estimate that losses due to fraudulent
sale of securities was between $330 and $350 million in 1978. This same survey reveals that
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ing desire on the part of state agency personnel and the members of the
bar who practice before these agencies to learn more about the investiga-
tory and enforcement provisions of the state securities acts. Unfortu-
nately, there has been little publication in the general area of blue sky
regulation,3 and even less dealing with investigative and enforcement
matters. This article will help fill this vaccuum.
Of necessity, this article focuses on the provisions of the Uniform Se-
curities Act4 [Uniform Act or Act] which thirty-five American jurisdic-
tions have adopted in whole or substantial part.6 Moreover, the investiga-
tory and enforcement provisions of many of the non-uniform acts
duplicate or closely parallel the Uniform Act sections. Thus, the article
will be of some value to readers in non-uniform act states.6
The Uniform Act provides three basic mechanisms for dealing with an
actual or threatened violation of the securities laws. First, the violator
may face administrative sanctions imposed by the securities agency itself.
Second, a court may restrain the violator or potential violator from pur-
suing his course of conduct through the civil injunctive process. Finally,
the violator may face criminal action.
A. Administrative Enforcement
The enforcement devices available through administrative action are
probably the most varied of any of the three basic enforcement mecha-
nisms. At the same time, these remedies are clearly the most limited in
scope. In general, each administrative remedy is directed to a particular
abuse and does not have general application. Those few administrative
remedies which are broad in scope are available only where the person
against whom enforcement is sought is willing to submit to administrative
jurisdiction.
Probably the most important administrative enforcement device is the
Securities Administrator's power under section 306 of the Uniform Act to
refuse the effectiveness of a registration sought or to suspend a registra-
tion which has become effective.7 In order to exercise this power, the Ad-
in the three year period ending September 30, 1978, in 95 cases investigated by the SEC,
30,000 investors lost $255 million. The Wall Street Journal, May 1, 1980, at 5, col. 3 (south-
west ed.).
' The only general works in the area of blue sky regulation are L. Loss & E. CownrT,
BLUE SKY LAW (1958), presently out of print, and H. SOWARDS & N. HIRSCH, BLUE SKY
REGULATION (1977), published as volume 11C, Parts 1 and 2 of the Matthew Bender Busi-
ness Organization series.
4 This Uniform Securities Act (Uniform Act or Act) is reprinted in Uniform Laws An-
notated (master ed. 1979).
5 See 1 H. SOWARDS & N. HIRSCH, BLUE SKY REGULATION § 1.03 n. 13 (Supp. 1978).
6 Some states have altered the language of the Uniform Act. Local customs and proce-
dures, especially in the areas of criminal law and administrative procedure, also have im-
pinged upon the Uniform Act. The reader should consult the statute and case law of the
particular jurisdiction.
7 See UNIFORM SEcuRrriEs AcT § 306(a) (1957)[hereinafter cited as U.S.A.].
[Vol. XXXVII
THE UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT
ministrator must make two findings. First, he must determine that it is in
the public interest to deny a tendered registration or to suspend an effec-
tive one. Second, he must find that any one or more of the nine specified
grounds for refusal, revocation, or suspension exists.8 The nine enumer-
ated grounds for denial or suspension of securities registration are: (1)
that the registration statement is or was materially incomplete or con-
tained misrepresentations of material facts;9 (2) that there has been a
willful violation, in connection with the offering, of the Act, any rule or
order of the Administrator, 0 or any condition lawfully imposed under the
Act on this particular registration;1 (3) that the security involved is the
subject of a stop order or temporary or permanent injunction from an-
other jurisdiction;12 (4) that the issuer's enterprise or method of doing
business is illegal;13 (5) that the offering would work or would tend to
8 Id. See In re Wesley Karban Wyatt, 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH)(Okla. Sec. Adm. Jan.
9, 1979), afl'd, (Okla. Sec. Comm'n March 16, 1979).
• See, e.g., In re Oriole Land & Dev. Corp., (Okla. Sec. Comm'n Sept. 15, 1970)(order
denying registration); In re American Engraving, Inc., (Okla. Sec. Comm'n Dec. 31, 1970)
(order revoking registration with prejudice).
10 See In re American Engraving, Inc., (Okla. Sec. Comm'n Dec. 31, 1970) (order revok-
ing registration with prejudice).
1 The Administrator can impose certain conditions on a particular registration which
are not imposed on registrations in general. For example, U.S.A. § 305(g) allows the im-
pounding of cheap stock and the escrowing of funds received in connection with sales under
the registration. See, e.g., Oklahoma Securities Commission, Statements of Policy Concern-
ing Cheap Stock; Warrants, Options and Cheap Stock; and Impounding Agreements, 2 BLUE
SKY L. REP. (CCH) 11 39,705 & 39,707, applied in, In re Frontier Int'l Raceways, Inc.,
(Okla. Sec. Comm'n July 31, 1970)(order revoking securities registration). Similarly, U.S.A.
§ 305(h) allows the Administrator to require the use of a particular type of sales contract or
subscription form.
1 The Official Comments indicate that the stop order or injunction from another juris-
diction must be currently in force to be the basis of the denial of suspension of a securities
registration. See L. Loss, Co NTARY TO TH UNFORM SECURrriEs AcT 82 (1976)(official
comment to § 306(a)(c)) [hereinafter cited as Loss]. Further, the action must be taken
within one year of the original stop order or injunction. See U.S.A. § 306(a)(c). Thus, the
provision does not permanently bar a security from registration. An Administrator can act
only if the reason for the stop order or injunction in the foreign jurisdiction is grounds for
such action under the local statute. In addition, the wording of U.S.A. § 306 implies that it
is not necessary that the particular block of securities which is the subject of the registration
statement also be the subject of the stop order or injunction; the provision merely requires
that the securities be of the same class as those that are subject to the stop order or
injunction.
1 The power to deny or suspend a securities registration because the enterprise or
method of doing business is illegal is very broad, but one which the state agencies have not
extensively used in recent years. Clearly the use of this power would be appropriate to pre-
vent the registration by a corporation wanting to operate a bawdy house in those states
where prostitution is illegal. Similarily, this power could properly prohibit the sale of lim-
ited partnership interests where the limited partnership was organized under the laws of a
state which prohibits a corporation from serving as a partner and the general partner of the
limited partnership is a corporation. Oklahoma was such a state until recently. Further, the
agency might inquire whether the issuer's business violates the state or federal antitrust
statute.
During the early days of securities regulation before 1930, securities agencies used the
19801
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work a fraud upon the purchaser;14 (6) that the offering contains unrea-
sonable amounts of underwriters', promoters', or sellers' profits, commis-
sions, discounts, or options; 5 (7) that securities sought to be registered by
notification are not entitled to such registration;"6 (8) that the person
seeking a co-ordination registration has not forwarded all amendments to
its federal registration; (9) that the registrant has not paid the registra-
tion fee imposed.
1 7
power to deny registration based on the illegality of the issuer's business to determine the
legality of many corporate practices under the state corporation statutes. Today the state
commissions, unfortunately, are more apt to limit their inquiry to a determination of
whether the issuer complies with the federal securities laws. The official comments, however,
do provide two notes of caution to the state agencies. See Loss, supra note 12, at 82 (official
comments to U.S.A. § 306(a)(d)). First, the public interest standards must be met. As a
result, the comments suggest that it would not be in the public interest to deny a registra-
tion based upon a department store issuer violating fair trade or minimum wage and hour
laws. Id. Second, the comments make clear that an agency cannot bar an issuer simply be-
cause the activity is illegal in the state where the registration is sought if the activity is legal
in the state where the issuer intends to conduct its business. Id. Thus, the shares of a corpo-
ration seeking to operate a bawdy house in Nevada could be sold in Iowa, even though
prostitution is legal in Nevada.
14 See, e.g., In re Frontier Int'l Raceways, Inc., (Okla. Sec. Comm'n July 31, 1970)(order
revoking securities registration); In re R. P. Company, Inc., (Okla. Sec. Comm'n Oct. 15,
1969)(order affirming order of administrator). The power to deny or suspend a securities
registration because the offering works a fraud on the purchaser gives the Administrator in a
non-fair, just, and equitable state some of the discretion enjoyed by his fair, just, and equi-
table brethren. The comments, however, make clear that this power is not as broad as the
"sound business principles" standard found in many of the early securities acts or the unde-
fined standard of fair, just, and equitable found in many mid-western acts. See Loss, supra
note 12, at 82 (official comments to U.S.A. § 306(a)(e)). The draftsmen's commentary, how-
ever, makes clear that this power is the place where the Uniform Act departs from the pure
disclosure format found under the federal act. Id. at 84-85 (draftsmen's commentary to
U.S.A. § 306(a)(e)).
18 See, e.g., In re Houston Science & Medical Corp., (Okla. Sec. Comm'n Dec. 8, 1970)
(order denying registration); In re The Time Plan Artesian Corp., (Okla. Sec. Comm'n Dec.
1, 1970)(order denying registration). Again, the power to deny or suspend a securities regis-
tration because the offering contains unreasonable profits, commissions, discounts, or op-
tions is an obvious departure from the full disclosure concept under the federal laws and
enters the realm normally reserved for the fair, just, and equitable regulators. Under this
provision, many states have adopted rather specific substantive rules. See, e.g., Oklahoma
Securities Commission, Statements of Policies Concerning Cheap Stock; Warrants, Options,
and Cheap Stock, 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 1 39,705 & 39,707.
18 See, e.g., In re National Funding Corp., (Okla. Sec. Comm Aug 14, 1969). The Uni-
form Act authorizes notification registration only for secondary trading in U.S.A. § 302. This
type of registration is virtually unused today. The Oklahoma Commission, for example, has
not had more than one or two notification registrations in over ten years. As a result, some
states delete this procedure when adopting the Uniform Act. Notification registration, how-
ever, could be an effective means of distribution of a control block of stock to the general
public.
17 If the Administrator denies or suspends registration because the registrant fails to
pay the registration fee, and the registrant subsequently pays the required registration fee,
then U.S.A. § 306 indicates that the Administrator must reinstate the registration if the
failure to pay was the only grounds for denial or suspension. Further, the last paragraph of
U.S.A. § 306(a) indicates that an Administrator may intentionally allow a registration which
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The second area where the Administrator has authority to act admin-
istratively is in connection with the exemptions from securities registra-
tion. Under section 402(c) of the Uniform Act, the Administrator can re-
voke both the transactional exemptions found in section 402(b)' 8 and the
securities exemptions for non-profit charitable institutions and employee
benefit plans."9 The Administrator's authority, however, is limited. He
may only revoke these exemptions as to a particular security or transac-
tion and does not have authority to withdraw any exemption generally. 0
Undoubtedly, the draftsmen intended the limitation on the Adminis-
trator's authority to protect the public against arbitrary action by the Ad-
ministrator. In practice, however, this limitation severely hampers the
Administrator's ability to protect the public in three specific areas. First,
because the Administrator can only revoke exemptions as to a particular
class of securities, there is nothing to prevent the offending issuer from
simply creating and offering a new class of securities which are not sub-
ject to the withdrawal order. Second, the Administrator can only direct
the withdrawal order toward the issuer or seller of the securities, and not
toward their officers, directors, or promoters. As a consequence, a group
of shady promoters whose corporation loses its exemptions may simply
organize a new corporation and begin offering similar securities. 21 Finally,
he knows is defective in some respect to become effective. He then has 30 days after the
effective date to commence stop-order proceedings on this defect. This power allows the
Administrator to secure jurisdiction over a registrant and to determine whether he wishes to
take action without holding up the registration.
18 See, e.g., In re Discount Mart Corp., [1971-1978 Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY L. REP.
(CCH) 71,003 (Okla. Sec. Comm'n Oct. 28 1970)(withdrawing all exemptions); In re Finan-
cial Reserve, Inc., (Okla. Sec. Comm'n Aug. 6, 1969)(withdrawing all exemptions from past
and present officers and directors of issuer and affiliate companies); In re Community Nat'l
Life Ins. Co., (Okla. Sec. Comm'n Jan. 15, 1969) (withdrawing the manual exemption of
U.S.A. § 402(b)(2)); In re Provident Fin. Corp., (N.J. Sec. Bur. March 26, 1976)(withdrawing
the commercial paper exemption).
19 U.S.A. §§ 402(a)(9) & (11).
20 See Loss, supra note 12, at 136 (official comment to U.S.A. § 403(c)). The Adminis-
trator may withdraw a single exemption. For example, he could withdraw the U.S.A. §
402(a) (11) exemption and prohibit a particular company from selling additional securities to
its existing securities holders or the Administrator can issue an order containing a blanket
withdrawal of all the exemptions. Administrators often employ this latter approach in con-
junction with a summary cease and desist order.
1 U.S.A. § 402(c) talks in terms of withdrawing or denying an exemption "with respect
to a specific security or transaction." The official comments expand on this by saying that
this authority applies only with respect to a specific case and that the Administrator has no
authority by rule or otherwise to revoke any statutory exemption generally. Both the
Oklahoma and Wisconsin Commissions avoid this single case limitation to a certain extent
by naming the officers, directors, and promoters as parties to the original revocation action
and then withdrawing the exemptions as to all the named parties and their affiliates or
successors as well as any business enterprise owned, operated, or directly or indirectly con-
trolled by any of the parties. See, e.g., In re International Mining Exchange, No. X-1555(E)
(Wis. Sec. Comm'n Dec. 18, 1979); In re Fine Arts Investment Group, Inc., No. X-1464(E)
(Wis. Sec. Comm'n Sept. 28, 1979); In re Financial Reserve, Inc. (Okla. Sec. Comm'n Aug. 6,
1969).
1980]
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the Administrator cannot withdraw the exemptions from particular types
of securities which are causing him substantial problems. Thus, the Ad-
ministrator may not withdraw the exemptions as to investment contracts
involving exotic investments such as worm farms, 22 commodity forward
contracts,23 or vending machine franchises.24 Of course, in all these cases,
the Administrator can withdraw the exemptions on an individual basis as
the new offerings appear. Before the Administrator can take such action,
however, he must first learn of the offering. Often the Administrator is
one of the last to learn of such offerings and cannot act until after there is
substantial harm to the investing public.
25
The Administrator may summarily withdraw the exemptions, but he
must subsequently give all interested parties an opportunity for hearing.
Further, section 402(c) indicates that a person is not subject to either
civil or criminal liability for non-registration of securities where the per-
son is relying on an exemption which the Administrator revokes if the
non-registrant can show that he did not know or with the exercise of rea-
sonable care could not have found out about the revocation order. A sum-
mary suspension order is frequently joined with a cease and desist order.
This joining of orders may be effective means of acquiring administrative
jurisdiction where the parties otherwise might not be willing to submit,
preferring rather to test the Administrator's cease and desist order in
court. The withdrawal of exemption order is a valid administrative order
which an issuer can challenge only through the administrative appellate
process.2" Hence, an issuer must submit to administrative jurisdiction to
challenge a withdrawal of an exemption which an administrator couples
with a cease and desist order.
Unfortunately, the Act is silent in one major detail. The Act provides
no standard which the Administrator must meet before revoking an ex-
2 See, e.g., In re Long's Long Life Wormery, Inc., 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 71,441
(Iowa Ins. Comm'n Mar. 22, 1978); In re Worm World, Inc., 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH)
$71,414 (S.D. Sec. Div. April 20, 1978), afl'd, 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) $ 71,419 (S.D. Bd.
Rev. June 8, 1978). See also In re International Plant Growers, 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH)
71,490 (Ariz. Sec. Div. Aug. 11, 1978).
23 State v. Forbes and Bradstreet, Inc., 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) $ 71,541 (D. Mont.
Mar. 24, 1980); Pierce Worcester v. State, 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 1 71,530 (D. Hawaii,
Oct. 10, 1979); Commonwealth v. Ramco Petroleum, Inc., 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 1
71,525 (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 4, 1980); In re Attorney General (American Petroleum Ex-
change Corp.), 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) $ 71,544 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 5, 1980).
24 In re Uniserv., Inc., 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 1 71,501 (S.D. Sec. Div. April 19, 1979); In re
CAB Enterprises, Inc., 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 5 71,509 (Ga. Sec. Comm'n Dec. 20, 1978).
22 In one Oklahoma case the judge enjoined a particular offering and required the pro-
moters to make restitution to the original purchasers. To the chagrin of the Commission and
the judge, the promoters were raising the money to make restitution by selling stock in a
newly organized corporation, not covered by the injunction, in violation of the Oklahoma
Securities Act.
" See In re Atomite Corp., 29 Dauph. Co. Rep. 113, subsequent consideration, 29
Dauph. Co. Rep. 195 (1926) (decisions of Administrator immune from declaratory judgment
attack).
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emption. If a hearing is requested, however, the Administrator must enter
findings of fact and conclusions of law.2 7 The Administrator's discretion,
therefore, is not totally unbridled and may be reviewed for abuse.28 At a
minimum, the Administrator must find that it is in the public interest to
require the selling of the securities, if at all, through the registration pro-
cess rather than under an exemption.
The last provision giving the Administrator specific authority to take
administrative action is section 204(a), authorizing the Administrator to
deny, revoke, or suspend the registration of broker-dealers and agents.
Similar to the procedures under section 306 dealing with the suspension
of registrations, the Administrator must meet two standards before he
can act. First, the Administrator must find that it is in the public interest
to deny, suspend, or revoke the registration. Second, he must find that
one of the eleven grounds specified in the statute for denial, revocation,
or suspension exists. These grounds range from filing a false, misleading,
or incomplete application to being denied, suspended, or enjoined by an-
other jurisdiction. 9 Probably, the single most important ground is that
the defendant is engaging in dishonest or unethical practices in the secur-
ities business."0 A number of states use this requirement as a statutory
basis for the adoption of a code of professional conduct,3 1 the violation of
which will subject the violator to both civil3 2 and criminal liability.3
In addition to these specific enforcements powers, the Administrator
has two other broad general enforcement tools at his disposal. Under sec-
tion 407(a) the Administrator may conduct investigative hearings to de-
termine whether there has been a violation of the Act. These hearings
may either be open to the public, i.e., subject to press coverage and public
inspection of the information compiled,34 or may be held in private, in
- U.S.A. § 402(a).
28 Cf. Doble Steam Motors Corp. v. Daugherty, 195 Cal. 158, 232 P. 140 (1924)(denial of
permit appropriate exercise of jurisdiction).
2' See U.S.A. § 204(a). The Oklahoma Administrator recently denied registration based
upon a consent injunction under the federal securities act. See In re Wesley Karban Wyatt,
(Okla. Sec. Adm. Jan. 9, 1979), aff'd, (Okla. Sec. Comm'n March 16, 1979).
30 See U.S.A. § 204(a)(2)(G); see, e.g., Selig v. Novak, 256 Ark. 278, 506 S.W.2d 825
(1974).
' See, e.g., Okla. Sec. Comm'n Rule R-204(G), 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) % 46,406
(1980); Wis. Sec. Comm'n, Statement of Policy: Interpretation of Suitability Rule, 3 BLUE
SKY L. REP. (CCH) 1 52,741 (1971). See also In re Hunt & Fitzgerald, Inc. [1971-1978
Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 1 71,004 (Okla. Sec. Comm'n June 9, 1971).
32 U.S.A. § 410. An investor will also have a cause of action against the broker-dealer's
or agent's bond under U.S.A. § 202(e). See, e.g., Farmers & Merchants Bank v. George W.
Stone Co., 27 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 529 (C.P. 1929). Recently, a court held that the state adminis-
trator might also bring suit under this bond. See State v. Maryland Cas. Co., 27 Or. App.
735, 557 P.2d 258 (1976).
U.S.A. § 409.
, Most states now have public information statutes similar to the federal Freedom of
Information Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552-552g (1976). These state statutes will generally control the
provisions of the relevant securities act unless the securities act provides access not availa-
ble under the general information statute. The Uniform Act does contain one rather limited
1980]
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which case there is no right of inspection or coverage.3 5 Further, section
407(a) specifically authorizes the Administrator to publish information
concerning violations of the Act.s6 The use of the section 407(a) powers
raises obvious problems where such use is not the first step in some other
administrative or judicial action by the Administrator. 7 A public investi-
gation with press coverage and no restriction on the admission of hearsay
evidence can become a circus and has overtones of McCarthyism. On the
other hand, present indications are that these unfair public hearings are
not unconstitutional as a per se deprivation of due process.3 s The person
investigated, however, must be given certain rights, including the right to
cross-examine and the right to present rebuttal evidence.
3 9
Hearings conducted pursuant to section 407(a) and the resulting pub-
lication of findings appear to be very appropriate for making the public
aware of a general practice or type of offering which the Administrator
feels is new and in violation of the Act. Thus, in the mid-1970's a number
of commissions appropriately used hearings to warn the public against
the commodity option schemes which were sweeping the country. 0 Due
to the possibility of abuse, however, an Administrator should not use
hearings as an alternative to other administrative or judicial enforcement
mechanisms in connection with particular cases or individuals.
41
The second broad enforcement tool is the cease and desist order. His-
access provision. See U.S.A. § 413(c). While there is some authority to the contrary, see, e.g.,
Koch v. Department of Justice, 376 F. Supp. 313, 315 (D.D.C. 1974), courts generally indi-
cate that the federal act allows public inspection of inactive investigatory files.
3 The best way to initiate investigative hearings under U.S.A. § 407(a) is for the Ad-
ministrator to issue a formal order of investigation. In this order the Administrator should
state whether the investigation will be public or private.
" See U.S.A. § 407(a)(3). The basis of the power to publish information concerning
violations of the Act is similar to authority given the SEC. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a)-(d)
(1976). The SEC has, on certain occasions, used this authority to publish findings where it
did not think that the violation warranted further enforcement action but where it wished
to point out that the practices were improper. See, e.g., In re Greater Washington Investors,
Inc., [1979 Transfer Binder] Fam. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,032 (SEC Mar. 22, 1979); In re
Spartek, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15567 (Feb. 14, 1979), 491 Sac. REG. &
L. REP. (BNA) E-1 (1979); In re Ward La France Truck Corp., 13 S.E.C. 73 (1943).
37 See In re Spartek, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15567 (Feb. 14, 1979),
491 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) E-4, E-6 (1979)(Karmel, Commissioner, dissenting).
See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 700-01 (1976); Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442-
43 (1959).
39 See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 428 (1969).
40 See, e.g., In re Commodity Options, 1 BLUE SKY L. RaP. (CCH) % 9722 (Colo. Sec.
Comm'n 1973); In re Commodity Options, Notice and Order, 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 1 57,456
(Utah Sec. Comm'n Mar. 2, 1973). Because of his specific statutory authority it may be
desirable for the Administrator, rather than other police or law enforcement agencies, to use
investigative hearings to warn the public of securities violations.
41 See In re Marine Protein Corp. Indus. Revenue Bonds, SEC Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 15567 (Apr. 11, 1979), 499 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) E-1, E-3 (1979)(Karmel,
Commissioner, dissenting); In re Spartek, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15567
(Feb. 14, 1979), 491 SEc. REG. & L. RaP. (BNA) E-4, E-6 (1979)(Karmel, Commissioner,
dissenting).
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torically, state administrators have relied heavily on cease and desist or-
ders. Present research indicates that the practice began in Missouri as
early as 1923.42 Oklahoma began issuing such orders in 1936,43 while Vir-
ginia was issuing such orders by 1948."4 Other states issued such orders as
early as the 1960's and early 1970's.45 Today, the practice is widespread.
In the fall of 1979, the Oklahoma Securities Commission conducted a sur-
vey of the members of the North American Securities Administrators As-
sociation. Of the fifty-two American jurisdictions, thirty-nine responded,46
of which twenty-seven were Uniform Act jurisdictions4 7 and twelve were
not.4 8 Of those responding, thirty-six of thirty-nine presently issue cease
and desist orders. Of the Uniform Act states, only the District of Colum-
bia' does not presently issue such orders.50
While the practice of issuing such orders appears both wide-spread
and long-standing, its legal basis under the present Uniform Act is not as
clear. The Uniform Act does not grant the Administrator specific power
to issue cease and desist orders. Section 412(a), however, does authorize
"3 Cf. In re Hermann Helioplane Co., In re Bankers' Security Co. and In re Bownam &
Co., 4 United States Daily 2297, col. 1 (1929)(summarization).
4S Okla. Sec. Comm'n Order of Sept. 10, 1936. See In re Quebec Bond & Share Corp.,
(Okla. Sec. Adm. Apr. 26, 1954).
44 Commonwealth v. Travelers Health Ass'n, 46 Va. Corp. Comm'n Rep. 69 (1948),
af'd, 188 Va. 877, 51 S.E.2d 263 (1949), aff'd, 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
45See, e.g., In re Raymond Lee Organization, Inc., (Colo. Sec. Comm'n Apr. 18, 1972),
partially aff'd and partially rev'd, 36 Colo. App. 417, 543 P.2d 75, rev'd, 192 Colo. 112, 556
P.2d 1209 (1976); Securities Comm'n v. Holovachka, 234 Ind. 135, 124 N.E.2d 380 (1955); In
re Jacobs, (Ohio Sec. Div. May 8, 1961); In re Golden Circle Gospel Foundation, Inc., (Tex.
Sec. Bd. Feb. 21, 1966). See also Parnall & Ticer, A Survey Of The Securities Act Of New
Mexico, 2 N. Max. L. Rav. 1, 43 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Parnall & Ticer] (indicates that
four other jurisdictions, the District of Columbia, Missouri, New Mexico, and South Caro-
lina, reported that their administrators issued such orders).
46 The responses to the survey conducted by the Oklahoma Securities Commission are
on file in the records of the Oklahoma Commission.
,4 The Uniform Act jurisdictions are Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District
of Columbia, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Mon-
tana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon,
South Carolina, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
48 The responding states that are not Uniform Act jurisdictions are Arizona, California,
Florida, Georgia, Illinois, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Texas.
4" District of Columbia officials have indicated that they do issue cease and desist
orrders. See Parnall & Ticer, supra note 45, at 43. The response to the Oklahoma survey did
not report this change in position or offer any explanation of it.
50 The non-uniform states which do not presently issue cease and desist orders are New
Hampshire and New York. Eight Uniform Act jurisdictions-Alabama, Arkansas, Idaho,
Maryland, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, and Utah- did not respond to the survey.
Two of these states, Arkansas and Michigan, had a specific statutory authorization for the
issuance of cease and desist orders, and two others, Pennsylvania and Utah, appear to issue
such orders or their equivalent. See, e.g., In re Sherry and Rob Farms, Inc., (Pa. Sec.
Comm'n Sept. 6, 1978)(summary notification to cease advertising and order), summarized
in, PA. Sac. COMM'N BuLL. 12 (Sept.-Oct. 1978); In re Kaylar Dev. Corp. (Pa. Sec. Comm'n
Sept. 2, 1977), summarized in, PA. Sac. Com'N BuLL. 10 (Jan.-Feb. 1978).
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the Administrator to "from time to time make, amend, and rescind such
rules, forms, and orders as are necessary to carry out the provisions of
this act." The Uniform Act Administrators traditionally point to this pro-
vision as authorizing the issuance of cease and desist orders.51 Cases in-
volving cease and desist orders issued under section 412(a) have been
before the appellate courts of a number of states without challenge to the
authority of the Administrator to issue cease and desist orders.52
The interpretation of section 412(a) to give the Administrator author-
ity to issue cease and desist orders is correct.53 Certainly such orders are
necessary and appropriate to carry out the mandate given the Adminis-
trator to enforce compliance with the substantive provisions of the Act.
Moreover, a cease and desist order is clearly an "order" within the mean-
ing of section 412(a) and is not an injunction. The Administrator lacks
the enforcement power of a court so that the cease and desist order does
not carry the weight of a judicial injunction.5
The only case which the author has been able to find which addresses
the question of whether general order authority is broad enough to en-
compass the issuance of cease and desist orders also supports the Admin-
istrator's position."" Motor Transport Co. was operating a bus line be-
tween Los Angeles and Santa Ana, California. The carrier boarded and
discharged passengers at intermediate points between the two cities. Mo-
tor Transport, however, had never sought authority from the Railroad
Commission to carry these passengers solely between intermediate points.
A competitor who had sought and received authority to carry local pas-
sengers on this route objected and the Railroad Commission issued a
summary cease and desist order. The summary order was upheld by the
Commission in a hearing in which Motor Transport participated. Motor
Transport then sought review of the order before the California Supreme
Court, claiming that the Commission did not have subject matter juris-
diction and also that the Commission lacked the authority to issue the
cease and desist order. The court rejected both contentions.
The court first noted that the regulation of routes was a matter within
the jurisdiction of the Railroad Commission in the same way that the sale
of securities within a particular state is within the jurisdiction of the se-
51 See Parnall & Ticer, supra note 45, at 42-43 (Oklahoma, New Mexico, Missouri,
South Carolina, and the District of Columbia, all Uniform Act states, rely upon the general
order authority in U.S.A. § 412(a)). See also text accompanying notes 46-50 supra.
" See Allstate Ind. Loan Plan, Inc. v. Mihalek, 555 S.W.2d 585 (Ky. 1977); Raymond
Lee Organization, Inv. v. Division of Securities, 556 P.2d 1209 (Colo. 1976); Scholarship
Counselors Inc. v. Waddle, 507 S.W.2d 138 (Ky. 1974); Data Access Sys., Inc., v. State, 63
N.J. 158, 305 A.2d 427 (1973); AMR Realty Co. v. State, 149 N.J. Super. 329, 373 A.2d 1002
(1977); Pioneer Finance Co. v. Pennsylvania Sec. Comm'n, 21 Pa. Commw. Ct. 447, 346 A.2d
890 (1975). See also Securities Conm'r v. Holovachka, 234 Ind. 135, 124 N.E.2d 380 (1955).
"See Parnall & Ticer, supra note 45, at 42-43.
See Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 655-656 (1950) (Minton, J.,
dissenting); Motor Transport Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 189 Cal. 573, 209 P. 586 (1922).
"5 See Motor Transport Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 189 Cal. 573, 209 P. 586 (1922).
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curities administrator." It then held that the Commission had authority
over those operating in violation of the law in the same way that it had
authority over those who were operating within it. To hold otherwise, ac-
cording to the court, would give the violator an undue advantage over the
person who was trying to compete legally.57 This same rationale supports
the Administrator's jurisdiction over unregistered broker-dealers and
agents and the illegal sale of unregistered securities.
Turning to the question of whether the Commission had the authority
to issue the cease and desist order, the court held that while the statute
did not specifically grant such authority to the Commission, it was not
unfair to imply this authority from a reading of the Commission's general
order authority. Moreover, the court stated that this implied authority
was not inconsistent with the Commission's authority to seek injunctive
relief. The court stated that the general order authority authorizes the
Commission to issue any order necessary in the exercise of its
jurisdiction. s
Traditionally, an administrator issues a cease and desist order either
summarily" or after a full administrative hearing. 0 Experience shows
that these orders can be an effective enforcement tool in three distinct
situations. First, in the case of a clear violation which the Administrator
believes to be either technical or inadvertent, the issuance of a summary
cease and desist order provides a quick, inexpensive, and uncomplicated
way to bring the infraction to the attention of the violator without resort-
ing to more formal court proceedings under section 408.61 Normally, be-
cause the violation is technical or inadvertant and the violator is a legiti-
mate business person attempting to act in good faith, the issuance of the
See id. at , 209 P. at 589. See also D & S Inv., Inc. v. Moore, 521 S.W.2d 118 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1975).
189 Cal. at --- , 209 P. at 589.
Id. at -, 209 P. at 590. Notwithstanding the general language of U.S.A. § 412(a), a
court may conclude that an Administrator does not have the authority to issue a cease and
desist order. See Consumer Companies of America v. Williams, No. 78 C10961 (Ky. Cir. Ct.,
Franklin County 1978), subsequently vacated as moot. See also Marley v. Lentz and Assoc.,
No. CJ-79-2625 (Okla. Dist. Ct., Okla. County, June 29, 1979), appeal pending, Okla. Sup.
Ct., No. 53,991. The uncertainty surrounding the ability of the Administrator to issue cease
and desist orders has led an increasing number of Administrators to seek clarifying amend-
ments to their Uniform Act to specifically authorize such orders. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. §
45.55.200 (1962); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-1254 (1966); KAN. STAT. § 17-1266a (1979 Supp.) The
amendments often insert a provision in U.S.A. § 408 of the Uniform Act giving the Adminis-
trator the choice of issuing a cease and desist order or going directly into court for an
injunction. ,
51 See, e.g., In re Inspirational Family Reading Center, (Okla. Sec. Comm'n Jan. 9,
1979)(summary cease and desist order); In re Jacobs, (Ohio Sec. Div. May 8, 1961)(letter
cease and desist order).
60 See, e.g., In re Economou, 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 71,515 (Iowa Ins. Comm'n
Apr. 24, 1979).
61 See, e.g., In re Jacobs, (Ohio Sec. Div. May 8, 1961) (letter cease and desist order); In
re Quebec Bond & Share Corp. (Okla. Sec. Comm'n Apr. 26, 1954)(letter cease and desist
order).
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order is all that is necessary to bring about compliance with the Act. This
procedure is also advantageous to the person who is the subject of the
order. By issuing the order in letter rather than formal form and by re-
stricting the publicity which is given its issuance, the Administrator may
largely avoid the disruptive and injurious impact that more formal pro-
ceedings might have upon the violator's business.
Second, where the infraction is clear-cut and the individuals involved
are known securities violators or con artists, the Administrator may use
the summary cease and desist order as a quick and inexpensive way of
informing the general public of the illegal activities and thereby attempt
to avoid further loss. The use of such an order, however, is not a panacea
in all such cases. While such action, especially if given wide publicity, will
educate the public, it also will tip the Administrator's hand that he is
aware of the illegal activity. Most known securities violators or con artists
are not interested in contesting the legality of their activities. They are
fully aware that they are violating the law. Therefore, when the adminis-
trator exposes their scheme by the issuance of the summary cease and
desist order, they will immediately cease their activities and either go un-
derground or move on to greener pastures in other states. In one sense
this is exactly what the Administrator wants. On the other hand, by driv-
ing the violator underground or out of the state, the Administrator makes
it much more difficult to give service of process or personal jurisdiction
2
over the violator to pursue either criminal or civil remedies. Therefore,
the Administrator must carefully weigh the immediate advantage of in-
stant publicity against the increased difficulty that such action will cause
him in seeking a more permanent halt to the illegal activity through a
civil injunction or criminal prosecution.
Finally, where the violation is less clear, the use of the cease and de-
sist process provides both the Administrator and the alleged violator with
an administrative alternative to the more traditional judicial procedure
for initiating and resolving a disputed interpretation of the Act. The Ad-
ministrator can initiate this procedure in either of two ways. If the Ad-
ministrator feels that the disputed practice is sufficiently injurious to the
public that it should be stopped pending resolution of the issue, he will
issue a summary cease and desist order giving the violator the opportu-
62 While extradition for criminal violation of the securities acts appears to be increas-
ing, such procedure is still not widespread. Research reveals only a few reported cases in-
volving extradition for securities violations. See Lewis v. Commissioner of Corrections, 181
N.Y.L.J. 11, col. 4M (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 3, 1979)(involving extradition to Alabama for acts
committed in Alabama); Greenbaum v. Darr, 220 Kan. 525, 552 P.2d 993 (1976)(involving
extradition of Kansas resident who performed acts in Kansas which constituted violation of
the Texas Securities Act because effect of his act occurred in Texas); Cope v. State, 402 P.2d
970 (Idaho 1965)(extradition to Washington for acts committed in Washington). See also
Long, The Conflict of Laws Provisions of the Uniform Securities Act, or When Does A
Transaction "Take Place In This State" - Part I, 31 OKLA. L. REv. 781, 812-15
(1978)[hereinafter cited as Long, Conflict] (general discussion of extradition in connection
with securities violations).
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nity for a subsequent full administrative hearing as to whether the sum-
mary order ought to be made permanent.6 3 If the alleged violator is a
legitimate businessman he normally will honor such an order, if he elects
to pursue the issue administratively,"' until such time as there can be a
full investigation of the matter and final resolution in an administrative
hearing. If the practice does not create a sufficiently dangerous threat to
the public, or the jurisdiction of the Administrator over the practice in
question is sufficiently tenuous, i.e., if there is a substantial question
whether the interests sold are securities, the Administrator often will
forego the issuance of the summary cease and desist order and will merely
issue a "show cause" order requiring the alleged violator to appear and
show cause why the Administrator should not enter a permanent cease
and desist order."
While only the Administrator may institute these cease and desist ac-
tions,"s participation is elective on the part of both parties. The Act
clearly does not require the Administrator to use the cease and desist
order as the first step in any civil injunctive or criminal action. The Ad-
ministrator may file these actions under sections 408 and 409 directly if
63 See, e.g., In re Economou, 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 1 71,515 (Iowa Ins. Comm'n
Apr. 24, 1979).
The alleged violator must make a critical decision when the Administrator issues a
summary cease and desist order against him. The alleged violator must decide whether he is
willing to submit to an administrative resolution of the issue or whether he wishes to resort
to a judicial forum in the first instance. If he desires the latter he should ignore the sum-
mary order and not request a hearing. If he requests such a hearing and begins to partici-
pate in the administrative process, then the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative reme-
dies suggests that he cannot seek judicial resolution through an injunctive proceeding to
prevent the Administrator from continuing the administrative process. See, e.g., First Jersey
Sec., Inc. v. Bergen, 605 F.2d 690 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 1020 (1980); Mar-
shall v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 595 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1979); California v. FTC, 549 F.2d
1321 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 876 (1977). But see Consumer Companies of America
v. Williams, No. 78C10961 (Ky. Cir. Ct., Franklin County 1978); Lentz and Assoc. v. Marley,
No. CJ-79-2625 (Okla. Dist. Ct., Okla. County June 29, 1979), writ of prohibition and ap-
peal filed, No. 53928 (Okla. July 11, 1979). If the alleged violator does not like the decision
of the Administrator he may seek judicial review of the decision under U.S.A. § 411. See,
e.g., Raymond Lee Organization, Inc. v. Division of Sec., 192 Colo. 112, 556 P.2d 1209
(1976). When the alleged violator exhausts his appellate rights under U.S.A. § 411 the mat-
ter becomes res judicata and he may not relitigate the issue when the Administrator seeks
judicial enforcement of the order. See, e.g., Public Serv. Comm'n v. International Ry. Co.,
106 Misc. 364, 174 N.Y.S. 708 (Sup. Ct. 1919); Public Serv. Comm'n v. New York & Queens
Gas Co., 103 Misc. 703, 170 N.Y.S. 1009 (Sup. Ct. 1918).
615 See In re Goldstein, Samuelson, Inc., [1971-1978 Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY L. REP.
(CCH) 71,095 (Okla. Sec. Adm. Feb. 23, 1973); In re Discount Mart Corp., [1971-1978
Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 71,003 (Okla. Sec. Adm. 1970). Again, the al-
leged violator is put to the choice of electing an administrative resolution by appearing and
participating in the administrative hearing or ignoring the hearing and forcing a judicial
resolution.
"Though the Administrator is the only one that can institute a cease and desist action,
some states have a procedure whereby others may initiate administrative proceedings seek-
ing declaratory rulings. See MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE Acr § 306, 13 UNm-
FORM LAWS ANN. 46 (master ed. 1980)(pamphlet).
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he feels that the violations are severe enough to warrant immediate judi-
cial action. The violator also does not have to submit to an administrative
resolution of the dispute. It is clear under the Uniform Act that the Ad-
ministrator does not have the power to punish for contempt of his or-
der.e6 If the violator continues to act in the face of the cease and desist
order, the Administrator, if he wishes to pursue the matter further, has
no choice but to go into court to seek an injunction under section 408. In
so doing, the Administrator will have to rely on the conduct covered by
the cease and desist order rather than the violation of the cease and de-
sist order itself." By simply ignoring the Administrator's order, the al-
leged violator will get the opportunity to have the dispute heard by a
court in the first instance.0 9
Thus, the issuance of a cease and desist order may be of limited legal
effect. The order is merely an indication that the Administrator questions
the legality of the alleged violator's practice. The order also contains an
invitation to resolve the dispute by the more informal administrative pro-
"' The Administrator does not have the power to punish for contempt of the cease and
desist order under either the uniform or non-uniform acts. The one exception to this rule
appears to be the Virginia Corporation Commission. Under the Virginia act, the Corporation
Commission is a court of record with the authority to issue injunctions and to punish for
violation of those injunctions in the same way that a court of equity can. See VA. CODE §
13.1-519 (1978).
" Theoretically, the Administrator can claim that he has the power to issue an injunc-
tion based upon the violation of the cease and desist order alone. U.S.A. § 408 indicates that
grounds for an injunction include not only violation of the provisions of the Act but also any
rule or order entered thereunder. Clearly a cease and desist order is such an order. As a
practical matter, however, it is believed that few courts will issue an order enforcing a cease
and desist order without inquiring into the substantive basis for such order where the viola-
tor raises that issue. Thus, the violator will have his day in court on the merits of the dis-
pute. But see State v. Werner Pet. Corp. (S.C. Cir. Ct., Richland County June 28, 1976)(un-
reported) (criminal liability for violation of a cease and desist order). Nor will the concept of
res judicata, see note 64 supra, come into play because the Administrator will not have
reached a decision on the merits of the dispute. It is not clear, however, whether res judicata
is a factor where the Administrator, on his own motion, sets the case for administrative
hearing, takes testimoney, and enters a decision on the merits in default when the violator
does not appear. See, e.g., In re Playtime Marketing Mfg. Co. (Okla. Sec. Adm. May 31,
1978); In re Western Pacific Coin and Silver Exch., [1971-1978 Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY
L. REP. (CCH) 71,203 (Iowa Ins. Comm'n Jan. 23, 1975).
" There is substantial question whether the alleged violator can have the dispute heard
by a court in the first instance by filing a suit for declaratory judgment or for an injunction
to prohibit the Administrator from continuing with the administrative process. D & S Inv.,
Inc. v. Mouer, 521 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975), held that it was error for the trial court
to entertain a declaratory judgment suit to determine whether something is a security. The
court indicated that the question should have been presented to the Securities Commis-
sioner. See also In re Atomite Corp. 29 Dauph. Co. Rep. 113 (Pa. C.P. 1926), opinion on
further consideration, 29 Dauph. Co. Rep. 195 (Pa. C.P. 1926). In other legal areas, the
federal courts of appeal hold it to be error for the federal district court to enjoin a federal
agency from proceeding with an administrative hearing. See, e.g., First Jersey Sec. Inc. v.
Bergen, 605 F.2d 690 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 1020 (1980) (disciplinary action
of the NASD); Marshall v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 595 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1979)(jurisdic-
tion of OSHA over railroad yards).
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cess. Moreover, implicit in the issuance of a cease and desist order, is the
idea that if the practice continues, or there is not administrative resolu-
tion, more formal enforcement action through a civil injunctive proceed-
ing or criminal action will follow.
There are a number of advantages, both to the Administrator and the
alleged violator, resulting from the use of the informal administrative
process rather than the more formal civil injunctive or criminal actions.
The most obvious is that the administrative agency can bring its own ex-
pertise to bear on the question while the violator retains his protection
against agency bias or abuse through judicial review of the agency deci-
sion.70 Also, of course, there is the speed and informality of the adminis-
trative process over the more cumbersome and formal judicial approach.
Normally an administrative action will not draw the attention from the
media that a judicial proceeding will. Therefore, damage to the alleged
violator's business and reputation should be correspondingly reduced if
he prevails at the administrative hearing and on review. Further, there is
less stigma attached to an adverse administrative ruling than a judicial
ruling;71 therefore, there is less long-term impact on the violator, his busi-
ness, or his reputation.
There is one other major advantage to the alleged violator which flows
from the administrative process which is not available under the judicial
approach. Section 412(e) provides that the civil liability provisions of the
Act will not attach to transactions entered into by any person based upon
a good faith reliance on an order of the Administrator. This protection
exists even if the Administrator's order is later amended, rescinded, or
judicially determined to be invalid.72 Thus, if the alleged violator is able
70 U.S.A. § 411 provides for judicial review of the Administrator's decisions. Such re-
view is not de novo. The findings of the Administrator, to the extent supported by the
record, are binding upon the reviewing court. Either party, however, may petition the re-
viewing court to order the taking of additional evidence by the Administrator. See Western
Air Lines, Inc. v. Stephenson, [1954-1961 Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 1
70,396 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles County July 17, 1958), rev'd sub nom. Western Air
Lines, Inc. v. Sobieski, 191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 12 Cal. Reptr. 719 (1961).
71 Under most federal securities provisions the entry of a state administrative order,
unlike a similar judicial order, is not grounds for denial or revocation of a registration or
denial or withdrawal of an exemption. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 780(a)(4)(C) (1976)(broker-
dealer registration); 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.252(c) & (d) (1980) (Regulation A is not available or
may not be withdrawn if issuer or any officer, director, principal shareholder, or promoter
thereof is subject to injunction by any state or federal court). On the other hand, the Uni-
form Act authorizes the refusal or withdrawal of both broker-dealer and securities registra-
tion on the basis of such orders. See U.S.A. §8 204(a)(f) & 306(a)(2)(c). Under the Uniform
Act provisions, a consent or default injunction is sufficient. See In re Wesley Karban Wyatt,
(Okla. Sec. Adm. Jan. 9, 1979)(findings of fact, conclusions of law, and memorandum order
denying agent's registration).
7' The protection given by U.S.A. § 412(e) does not extend to a "no-action" letter is-
sued by the Administrator under U.S.A. § 413(e) since the Administrator does not issue
such opinions in the form of an order and they are not subject to judicial review. Loss,
supra note 12, at 400-01 (official comments to U.S.A. § 413(e)). The protection of U.S.A. §
412(e) only extends to actions taken in reliance on a "rule, order, or form." Id. at 155 (offi-
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to sustain his position at the administrative hearing, he will be free to
continue the practice without further challenge or fear of the imposition
of civil liability.7 3 This protection flows from the apparent inability of the
staff of the securities commission to take an appeal from an unfavorable
decision of the Administrator.7 4 Section 411 allows "any person aggrieved
by a final order of the Administrator" to appeal or seek review of that
order. It is not clear, however, whether the staff of the securities commis-
sion can qualify as an aggrieved person under section 411.
The Uniform Commissioners indicate that the drafters of section 411
patterned this section's language after that found in the Model Adminis-
trative Procedure Act.7 5 A majority of the cases under this, and similar
state administrative procedure acts, hold that a subordinate officer does
not have the authority to appeal an adverse administrative ruling of a
superior.76 The basis for these decisions is that a subordinate and supe-
rior represent the same interest and the superior has the authority and
responsibility to make the final administrative decision on matters affect-
cial comments to U.S.A. § 412(e)). The same is true under the federal statutes. See Greene
v. Dietz, 247 F.2d 689, 695 (2d Cir. 1957). This protection, however, is available if the issuer
seeks a formal declaratory determination by the Administrator as is authorized by some
administrative procedure acts. See Clayton Brokerage Co., Inc. v. Mouer, [1971-1978 Trans-
fer Binder] BLUm SKY L. REP. (CCH) 71,132 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Apr. 18, 1974), afl'd, 520
S.W.2d 802 (Tex. Ct. App.), dismissed, 531 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. 1975).
11 U.S.A. § 412(e) does not protect the violator from the imposition of criminal liability
for continued conduct in good faith reliance on an order of the Administrator. The sale of
unregistered securities is a malum prohibitum crime which does not require any malice or
evil state of mind. Therefore, a person may be guilty of selling unregistered securities even
though he does not know that he must register the securities or that he is even selling
securities. In United States v. Anzelmo, 319 F.Supp. 1106 (E.D. La. 1970), the court held
that receiving an opinion from the SEC that the selling of certain securities without regis-
tration was permissible did not insulate the defendant from prosecution for the sale of unre-
gistered securities. But see People v. Ferguson, 133 Cal. App. 41, 24 P.2d 965 (1933). It is
doubtful, however, except in the extreme case, that a prosecutor will seek a criminal convic-
tion for the sale of unregistered securities where the Administrator has held the interests
sold not to be a security.
7' In some states, such as Oklahoma, the administrative process involves two levels.
The case is first heard by the Administrator. The violator may then request a de novo hear-
ing before the Commission en banc. OIa.A. STAT. tit. 71, § 409 (1965). Under this procedure,
the violator gets two bites at the apple. If he convinces the Administrator of his position,
the staff cannot appeal to the Commission. If he does not convince the Administrator, but
does convince the Commission, then the staff or the Administrator may not appeal. Of
course the violator, if he fails to convince either, may still take a judicial appeal.
75 See Loss, supra note 12, at 152 (official comments to U.S.A. § 411). See also 54
HANDBOOK OF NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 334
(1944). The Model Administrative Procedure Act has since been withdrawn and replaced
with the Model State Administrative Procedure Act of 1961. See MODEL STATE ADmNISTRA-
TIVE PROCEDURES ACT, 13 Uniform Laws Ann. 467 (master ed. 1980)(pamphlet). The lan-
guage of § 15 of the 1961 Act closely parallels the language of U.S.A. § 411. Therefore, the
annotations to § 15 are helpful in construing the Uniform Act.
11 It is unclear whether a distinction should not be drawn between the superior acting
in a legislative or policy-making function and the superior acting in a judicial or quasi-
judicial function.
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ing that interest.77 There are, however, a number of decisions which take
a minority position and allow the subordinate to appeal.78 These decisions
emphasize the fact that a challenged practice should not escape judicial
review and take on a conclusive character by giving immunity to the al-
leged violator.7" While this latter rationale is more appealing, especially
because the administrative decision is given conclusive effect under sec-
tion 412(e), this position still remains a definite minority view.80
B. Enforcement by Civil Injunction
The second major enforcement tool available to the Administrator is
the ability to bring suit for civil injunctions under section 408 of the
Act.81 Such actions can prevent further violation of the Act or force corn-
7 See Iowa Dept. of Rev. v. Iowa St. Bd. of Tax Review, 267 N.W.2d 675, 678 (Iowa
1978); Davis, Standing of a Public Official to Challenge Agency Decisions: A Unique Prob-
lem of State Administrative Law, 16 AD. L. Rv. 163 (1964)(discussing rule and cases that
forbid subordinate from appealing a superior's decision). The rationale preventing a
subordinate from appealing a superior's decision is compelling when the superior is acting in
a legislative or policy-making capacity. This rationale, however, is less compelling when the
superior is acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial function. The rule may be a function of the
Administrator's dual role as administrative head of the agency as well as judge in a particu-
lar administrative proceeding. The Administrator, acting as the administrative head of the
agency, has the final authority to determine whether there will be an action. By deciding as
a judge in a particular case that the staff position has no merit, the Administrator may also
be making a decision as the administrative head of the agency that the agency should not
pursue the matter further.
73 See, e.g., Altman v. School Comm. of Scituate, 115 R.I. 399, 347 A.2d 37 (1975); In re
Halifax Paper Co., Inc., 259 N.C. 589, 131 S.E.2d 441 (1963); Elizabeth Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Howell, 24 N.J. 488, 132 A.2d 779 (1957).
70 See Altman v. School Comm. of Scituate, 115 R.I. 399, 347 A.2d 37 (1975).
40 While at one time it was thought that anyone who was not a party to the administra-
tive hearing could not seek an appeal or review of that decision, see, e.g., In re Atomite
Corp., 29 Dauph. Co. Rep. 113 (Pa. C.P. 1926), opinion on further consideration, 29 Dauph.
Co. Rep. 195 (Pa. C.P. 1926), it is now clear that the concept of "aggrieved persons" in-
cludes people who are not parties. See, e.g., Reagles v. Simpson, 72 Wash. 2d 577, 434 P.2d
559 (1967); Local 1344, Council No. 4, Am. Fed. of State, County, and Mun. Employees v.
Connecticut State Bd. of Labor Relations, 30 Conn. Supp. 259, 309 A.2d 696 (1973). Enlarg-
ing the number of "aggrieved persons" will allow at least limited appeals from a favorable
ruling by the Administrator for the alleged violator. It is clear that the attorney general or
chief legal officer of the state may bring such an appeal where there is a matter of public
policy involved. See, e.g., Mondale v. Commissioner of Taxation, 263 Minn. 121, 116 N.W.2d
82 (1962); In re Pub. Serv. Coordinated Transport, 5 N.J. 196, 74 A.2d 580 (1950). It is
doubtful, however, that any private party can come within the concept of an "aggrieved
person" where the ruling is favorable to the alleged violator. If the dispute involves deter-
mining whether something is a security the ruling of the Administrator will not bar the
rights of those who have already purchased. They may file their own suits under the Act and
the only effect upon their rights is the persuasive impact that the Administrator's opinion
might have upon the court. Parties who have not yet purchased clearly would be "aggrieved
persons" since the adjudication involves their rights. Normally at this point, however, these
potential purchasers are not identified or interested in pursuing the matter becase if they do
not agree with the Administrator they will simply refrain from buying the interest.
" The civil injunction is specifically available either to prevent an existing violation
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pliance with the Act or any rules or orders thereunder when there is a
threatened violation. All parts of the Act are subject to injunctive en-
forcement. Thus, an action can be brought to enjoin further violation of
the antifraud provisions of section 101,82 the securities registration provi-
sions of section 30183 or the broker-dealer, agent registration provisions of
section 201."
In many states, such as Oklahoma, these injunctive actions can be
brought by the enforcement staff of the securities agency without the con-
sent or help of the state attorney general or local district attorney. In a
number of states, however, such as Texas, such actions may be brought
only by the state attorney general at the request of the securities
agency.
85
In most states, the case law suggests that nothing more is necessary to
secure a prohibitory injunction against further violation of the Act than a
showing that there has been a violation of the Act.86 Certainly there is no
requirement, as in the case of a private litigant seeking an injunction,
that the Administrator show irreparable harm. 7 The federal courts, how-
ever, are indicating that the injunctive provisions of the federal acts, the
basis of the Uniform Act, are not punitive in nature but rather equitable
and prophylactic for the protection of the public.88 As a result, the federal
courts frequently require the Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC]
from continuing or re-occurring, or in the case of a potential or threatened violation to pre-
vent it from taking place in the first instance. U.S.A. § 408 provides that the Administrator
may seek a civil injunction "[wihenever it appears to the Administrator that any person has
engaged or is about to engage in any act or practice constituting a violation of any provision
of this act or any rule or order thereunder. . . . " Further, of course, if there is an actual
violation, the violator is subject to civil liability under U.S.A. § 410 to the purchaser of the
securities.
82 See, e.g., State v. Ford, [1971-1978 Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH)
71,299 (Alas. Super. Ct. June 28, 1976); Tower Credit Corp. v. State, 187 So. 2d 923 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
" See, e.g., Securities Comm'r v. McGovern, 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 71,438 (N.D.
Dist. Ct. 1978); Wee Mac Corp. v. State, 301 So. 2d 101 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
" See, e.g., Baldwin v. Oklahoma Sec. Comm., [1971-1978 Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY
L. REP. (CCH) 1 71,007 (Okla. Ct. App. 1971).
" The requirement that only the state attorney general can bring an action for a civil
injunction becomes extremely cumbersome when coupled with the requirement that only an
assistant attorney general may make the court presentation. In such situations, unless there
is an assistant attorney general assigned to the securities agency on a full or substantially
fulltime basis, the presentation will be inferior to one made by staff attorneys from the
securities agency. Some agencies have been successful in getting the attorney general to
appoint a member of the securities staff as a special attorney general for the sole purpose of
presenting a particular securities case.
81 See, e.g., Securities Comm'r v. McGovern, 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 1 71,438 (N.D.
Dist. Ct. May 30, 1978); State v. Creative Products, Inc., [1971-1978 Transfer Binder] BLUE
SKY L. REP. (CCH) 1 71,056 (Okla. Dist. Ct. Nov. 17, 1972).
'7 See Bradford v. SEC, 278 F.2d 566 (9th Cir. 1960); SEC v. Torr, 87 F.2d 446 (2d Cir.
1937); 3 L. Loss, SEcuRITIs REGULATION 1979-80 (2d ed. 1961).
" See, e.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963); SEC v.
Paro, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. RFP. (CCH) 1 96,816 (N.D.N.Y. March 28, 1979).
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to establish that there is a reasonable likelihood that future violations will
occur.89 This can be done not only by showing prior violations, but also
that these prior violations were knowingly and willfully done.90 Other fac-
tors which a court will consider in ruling on the issuance of an injunction
are the magnitude and frequency of the violations, whether the violator
continues to maintain that his past conduct was blameless, whether the
violator voluntarily ceases the questioned practice, whether his assur-
ances that he will not repeat such conduct are sincere, and whether it is
reasonable to expect further violations to occur in light of the violator's
professional standing.91 This stricter standard can now be found in some
state cases,92 and it is reasonable to expect that state courts will increas-
ingly require this showing in the future.
One other major question in connection with prohibitory injunctions
under the Uniform Act concerns the standard of conduct necessary to
show a violation of the anti-fraud provisions of section 101. Section 101
patterns the language of section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 ('33
Act)9s and Rule 10b-5." In the landmark case of Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder5 the Supreme Court held that a private litigant must prove
scienter in order to be able to recover under Rule 10b-5. While it is not
entirely clear whether the Court meant scienter in the common law sense
of not only an intentional act, but also one done with the intent to cause
injury, or merely a knowing act, the lower federal courts have been virtu-
ally unanimous in holding that scienter means only a knowing act or one
done in total disregard for the truth."s
8, See, e.g., SEC v. Commonwealth Chemical Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1978); SEC
v. Paro, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 96,816 (N.D.N.Y. March 28,
1979). The injunctive provisions are really not punitive in nature, but rather equitable and
prophylactic in order to protect the public. The flexible nature of the injunctive provisions
creates a need for a procedure at both the state and federal level for determining whether a
particular practice or the sale of a particular interest violates the securities acts without the
stigma of an injunction. This can, in part, be done at the state level through the use of the
cease and desist power discussed in the previous section. See text accompanying notes 42-80
supra. Yet, the administrative route is often unacceptable to the person whose conduct is
called into question. The Act needs to be amended to include a procedure similar to the
declaratory judgment arrangement where the Administrator alone, or either the Administra-
tor or the challenged party, can have a court determine the validity of the practice without
necessarily seeking an injunction.
90 See SEC v. Paro, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RaP. (CCH) 96,816
(N.D.N.Y. March 28, 1979).
91 See, e.g., SEC v. Universal Major Ind. Corp., 546 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1976); SEC v.
Paro, [1979 Transfer Binder] FEn. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 96,816 (N.D.N.Y. March 28, 1979).
"I See, e.g., Shaul v. Crofters, Inc., [1971-1978 Transfer Binder] BLUm SKY L. REP.
(CCH) 1171,049 (Ohio C.P. Sept. 19, 1972); State v. Cathedral of Tomorrow, Inc., [1971-1978
Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 1 71,052 (Ore. Cir. Ct. Oct. 9, 1972).
,3 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976).
- 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979).
Is 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
ISee, e.g., Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1977). The present
standard for reckless disregard appears to be a highly unreasonable omission involving an
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The Court, however, specifically left open two very important ques-
tions. First, is the standard under section 17(a) of the '33 Act the same as
that under Rule 10b-5? Second, is scienter required in SEC enforcement
actions under either Rule 10b-5 or section 17(a)?9 ' The lower federal
courts have split as to the answer to these major questions. Some courts,
arguing that the standard ought to be the same whether the plaintiff is
the SEC or a private litigant, hold that scienter is necessary for SEC in-
junctive actions under Rule 10b-5.98 Other courts, including the Second
Circuit, hold that negligence rather than scienter is the standard for SEC
injunctive actions based upon the idea that the SEC injunctive actions
are prophylactic in nature and are for the protection of the public."
On the other hand, the vast majority of courts hold that negligence
rather than scienter is the appropriate standard for SEC injunctive ac-
tions based upon section 17(a) of the '33 Act.100 The difference in treat-
ment between injunctive actions under section 17(a) and Rule 10b-5 lies
in the fact that Rule 10b-5 has its statutory authorization in section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act). As the Second Circuit in
SEC v. Coven'0 pointed out, the Supreme Court in Hochfelder looked at
the language of section 10(b), which talks in terms of manipulative or
deceptive devices, and concluded that this language demanded a scienter
standard. Therefore, the scienter standard of the statute naturally over-
rides and controls the parameters of the more liberal language of the
Rule. The Coven court also pointed out that the language of section 17(a)
is not subject to any controlling statutory provision. Section 17(a) is not
an administrative rule that is bound by statutory guidelines. Therefore,
there is no reason to deny the language of section 17(a) its natural mean-
ing which does not impose a scienter requirement. 0 2
extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care which presents a danger of mislead-
ing buyers or sellers that is known to the defendant or is so obvious that he must have been
aware of it. See Franke v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,786 at 90,850 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 8, 1976), quoted with approval in,
Sanders v. John Nueveen & Co., Inc., 554 F.2d 790, 793 (7th Cir. 1977).
07 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 n.12 (1976).
"' See SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1978); SEC v. Wills, [1979 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 96,712 (D.D.C. Dec. 14, 1978).
" See, e.g., SEC v. Aaron, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. T 96,800 (2d Cir.
1979), vacated, 100 S.Ct. 1945 (1980).
100 See SEC v. Blazon Corp., 609 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1979); SEC v. American Realty
Trust, 586 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1978); SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1978); SEC v.
World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1976); SEC v. Shiell, [1977-1978 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) T 96,190 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 27, 1977); SEC v. Southwestern
Coal & Energy Co., 439 F. Supp. 820 (W.D. La. 1977); SEC v. Geotek, 426 F. Supp. 715
(N.D. 'Cal. 1976). But see SEC v. Cenco Inc., 436 F. Supp. 193 (N.D. IM. 1977). Several
courts take the position that an implied civil cause of action under § 17(a) of the '33 Act
requires a showing of scienter in the same way as the Court required scienter for civil recov-
ery under Rule 10b-5 in Hochfelder. See, e.g., Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790
(7th Cir. 1977).
101 581 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1978).
101 See SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d at 1026-28. The Ninth Circuit adopted the rationale of
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The Supreme Court has resolved the dispute at the federal level in
Aaron v. SEC.103 The Court first rejected the idea that there should be a
different standard under Rule 10b-5 for agency actions and private litiga-
tion. It held that the Hochfelder standard should apply to both. It then
concluded, as had the Second Circuit in Coven, that Hochfelder does not
automatically control section 17(a). The Court undertook an analysis of
section 17(a) and concluded that subsection (1) requires proof of scienter
because the Hochfelder reasoning applies equally to the language "to em-
ploy, any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud." The Court, however,
then held that the SEC need not prove scienter in enforcement actions
under either section 17(a)(2) or (3).
Administrators, in bringing a suit for an injunction under section 101,
should learn from these decisions and not assume or concede that it is
necessary to prove scienter in order to obtain the injunction. They should
vigorously advocate that their actions are prophylactic in nature and,
therefore, a negligence standard is more in line with the Act's purpose of
protecting the public. Further, under section 101, there is not the embar-
rassing problem of a double standard, one for enforcement actions and
another for civil recovery, because the Uniform Act specifically prohibits
implied causes of action.104 Thus, the Administrators should impress
upon the state courts that, like section 17(a), section 101 is the statutory
enactment rather than an administrative rule and, therefore, a court must
interpret the statute as it stands rather than in conjunction with the lan-
guage of a controlling statutory provision.105
To date, the author knows of no state enforcement cases 06 considering
the liability standard under section 101 since the Hochfelder decision.
Courts have considered the issue in both the civil and criminal context,
Coven in SEC v. Blazon Corp., 609 F.2d 960, 965-66 (9th Cir. 1979). The Coven court goes
on to point out that the legislative history of § 17(a) suggests that Congress intentionally
omitted a scienter requiremefit. Section 17(a) was originally introduced in Congress as § 13
of S. 875 (73d Cong., 1st Sess.). Section 13, as originally written, was framed in terms of
"willfully" employing a scheme to defraud and "with the intent to defraud." The House
dropped this language from the final bill.
103 [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,511 (U.S. June 2, 1980).
104 See U.S.A. § 410(h). See also Loss, supra note 12, at 151 (official comment to U.S.A.
§ 410(h)).
"' The Administrator should argue that, consistent with U.S.A. § 101, no scienter need
be shown when there is a broker-dealer or agent's license revocation under U.S.A. § 204(a).
Support for such a position lies in the fact that the SEC consistently holds that scienter has
no place in an administrative action based upon either § 17(a) or Rule lOb-5. See In re
Irwin, Adm. Proc. File No. 3-4726 (Feb. 22, 1977), summarized in, [1976-1977 Transfer
Binder] FEn. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,982; In re Steadman, 411 SEC. REG. & L. RE'. (BNA)
A-8 (June 29, 1977).
206 The New York Martin Act served as one of the foundations for the language of §
17(a) of the '33 Act. There are several New York cases, one of which pre-dates the '33 Act,
suggesting that the attorney general does not need to show scienter to obtain an injunction.
See People v. Royal Sec. Corp., 5 Misc., 2d 907, 165 N.Y.S.2d 945 (Sup. Ct. 1955); People v.
Federated Radio Corp., 244 N.Y. 33, 154 N.E. 655 (1926). See also People v. Barysh, 3 BLuz
SKY L. R . (CCH) 71,431 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978).
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and, while it is still too early to be sure, it appears that the state courts
will not follow Hochfelder. In a recently reported decision, Kittilson v.
Ford,'0  the Washington Supreme Court, in a civil suit,108 rejected
Hochfelder and specifically overruled a 1977 Washington decision which
had accepted it.109 The court relied on several of the rationales outlined
above. First, it pointed out that the "manipulative and deceptive" lan-
guage of section 10(b) of the '34 Act relied on so heavily by the Supreme
Court in Hochfelder was not included in the Washington act, and there-
fore, as the Supreme Court itself had noted, the operative language could
be read as not requiring scienter or intentional conduct. "' Second, the
court noted that the operative language in Washington was part of the
securities act itself rather than in a rule adopted under the statute and
controlled thereby. Finally, the court pointed out that there was no legis-
lative history behind the Washington act as the Supreme Court found
behind the federal provision requiring scienter. Therefore, the court
elected to follow pre-Hochfelder precedent in both Washington and
under other state acts and not require scienter."' Similar reasoning
caused the Arizona court of appeals in State v. Gunnison"'2 to reject
Hochfelder and hold, following earlier precedent," 3 that a criminal viola-
tion of the Arizona equivalent of section 101 is a malum prohibitum of-
fense which did not require scienter."
4
In addition to being able to obtain a prohibitory injunction, section
408 specifically authorizes the Administrator to seek the appointment of a
93 Wash. 2d 210, 608 P.2d 264 (1980).
'08 Washington did not adopt U.S.A. § 410(h) prohibiting implied causes of action. Ear-
lier, in the case of Shermer v. Baker, 2 Wash. App. 845, 472 P.2d 589 (1970), the court held
that § 101 of the Washington Act would support an implied cause of action.
'09 See Ludwig v. Mutual Real Estate Inv., 18 Wash. App. 33, 567 P.2d 658 (1977);
Note, Unlawful Securities Transactions and Scienter; An Emasculating Requirement, 1 U.
PUGET SPUND L. REv. 366 (1978); Comment, Securities Fraud Under the Blue Sky of Wash-
ington, 53 WASH. L. REV. 279 (1978)(both criticizing the Ludwig decision).
110 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212 (1976).
" See Treider v. Doherty & Co., 86 N.M. 735, 527 P.2d 498 (Ct. App. 1974); Shermer
v. Baker, 2 Wash. App. 845, 472 P.2d 589 (1970). See also Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith v. Byrne, 320 So. 2d 436 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); State v. Gunnison, No. 2 CA-CR
1700 (Ariz. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 1979). It is not totally clear whether the Kittilson court in-
tended to adopt a negligence standard or an absolute duty standard. Both Treider and
Shermer contain language which suggests the absolute duty standard, following the Ninth
Circuit decision in Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961). Shermer, however, which the
Kittilson court specifically adopted, talks also in terms of breach of fiduciary duty. To the
extent that a breach of fiduciary duty gives rise to negligent liability rather than absolute
liability the court may have adopted a negligence standard.
"I No. 2 CA-CR 1700 (Ariz. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 1979).
11 See State v. Burrow, 13 Ariz. App. 130, 474 P.2d 849 (1970)(non-registration of se-
curities and non-registration as a dealer).
114 But see Greenfield v. Cheek, 122 Ariz. 57, 593 P.2d 281 (1979)(civil recovery requires
proof of scienter under the Arizona equivalent of U.S.A. § 101). Because Gunnison has not
been officially reported, the matter will probably go on to the Arizona Supreme Court and
that court will either reconsider Greenfield or reverse Gunnison.
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receiver or conservator for any violator or his assets. 115 This power is ex-
tremely important in those cases involving known securities violators,
con-men, or willful violations of the Act. It allows the Administrator to
freeze and preserve the assets of the violator which the violator will oth-
erwise quickly dissipate. Action by the Administrator will give the injured
purchasers time to bring their actions for civil damages and a pool of
assets from which to get satisfaction.
There is one very important statement in the Draftsmen's Commen-
tary concerning the power of the court to appoint receivers. Professor
Loss indicates that he believes that the court has the power to appoint a
receiver without the language of the statute under its general equitable
powers to grant ancillary relief in a suit for an injunction.116 The signifi-
cance of this statement lies in the draftsmen's recognition that section
408 does not limit the remedies available to the Administrator to those
specifically spelled out, but allows all other types of remedies which the
court can grant under its general equitable jurisdiction.
The United States Supreme Court recognizes that the federal courts,
as part of their generMt equitable jurisdiction, have authority to grant re-
medial as well as prohibitory injunctions.117 One type of such injunction
that a federal court can order is that a statutory violator surrender into
the treasury of the court, for disposition as the court in its discretion may
order, any profits that the violator has made in the course of his violation.
The rationale for this order is that the violator should not profit from his
violation. Denying the violator the fruits of his violation will make crime
not pay and will discourage violations. 1 s
Building upon decisions under other statutes, the SEC in recent years
has been quite successful in pursuading courts, in connection with injunc-
tive actions under the federal act, to order disgorgement of profits.'1 0 The
SEC has accomplished this success in spite of the absence in the enforce-
ment provisions of either the '33 or '34 Acts of authority for the SEC to
seek such action, or the courts to grant it.12 0 Further, a court has even
awarded the Commission disgorgement where the court refused to grant
the prohibitory injunction also sought. 21
In spite of the Uniform Act's silence on the ability of the Administra-
,,5 See, e.g., Huff v. Sioux Options Ltd., [1971-1978 Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY L. REP.
(CCH) 1 71,197 (Iowa Dist. Ct. April 7, 1975).
116 See Loss, supra note 12, at 143 (draftsmen's comment to U.S.A. § 408).
11 See Mitchell v. Robert Demario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960); Porter v. Warner
Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946).
" S See United States v. Moore, 340 U.S. 616 (1951); Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328
U.S. 395 (1946).
'11 See, e.g., SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1974); SEC v. General Refractories
Co., 400 F. Supp. 1248 (D.D.C. 1975); SEC v. R.J. Allen & Associates, 386 F. Supp. 866 (S.D.
Fla. 1974).
120 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77u, 78v (1976).
" See SEC v. Penn Central Co., 425 F. Supp. 593 (E.D. Pa. 1976). See also United
States v. Moore, 340 U.S. 616 (1951).
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tor to seek disgorgement under section 408, based upon the Draftsmen's
Commentary and the SEC experience, such recovery should be available
under the state acts, and Administrators should seek such relief as an
effective enforcement tool. In two lower court cases 122 the courts refused
such claims without adequate discussion. More recently, the Ohio Su-
preme Court in State v. Buckeye Finance Corp.,23 held that the Ohio
Commission could not sue for rescission or restitution.
Buckeye Finance illustrates the misconception under which all three
courts which refused disgorgement were apparently suffering. An action
in disgorgement is not an action for rescission or restitution brought by
the state on behalf of the injured purchaser; instead, an action for dis-
gorgement is strictly a remedial enforcement tool of the Administrator to
deny the securities violator any rewards that he might receive as a result
of his violation.124 It is true that in the vast majority of cases the court
will order the funds paid into the treasury of the court for distribution to
those individuals injured by the securities violation rather than permit-
ting the funds to inure to the benefit of the state.15 As recently pointed
out in connection with an SEC settlement with some of the Penn Central
defendants, however, the SEC action for disgorgement does not in any
way impair or infringe upon the rights of the injured individuals to bring
a private civil suit to recover for their individual injuries. 2 ' Further, to
the extent that recovery is made under these private suits, the disgorge-
ment amount is reduced. 2 7 Thus, the SEC action is merely an attempt to
recover the violator's profits to the extent those profits are not claimed by
injured individuals in private suits. 28
Further, the two types of actions have different measures of recovery.
Under the theory of disgorgement, the Administrator may only recover
the profits which the defendant made in connection with the violation. 2"
On the other hand, under section 410, the measure of civil recovery by
112 See Wee Mac Corp. v. State, 301 So. 2d 101 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); State v. Dare
to Be Great, Inc., [1971-1978 Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 71,096 (Utah Dist.
Ct. 1972). See also State v. Moore, No. CD77-512 (Okla. Dist. Ct., Okla County Mar. 29,
1978).
113 54 Ohio St. 2d 407, 377 N.E.2d 502 (1978).
'I' See, e.g., SEC v. Penn Central Co., 425 F. Supp. 593, 595 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
125 Id.
" See SEC v. Penn Central Co., [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L. REP. (CCH) 1
96,809 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 1979).
127 See SEC v. Penn Central Co., 425 F. Supp. 593 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
128 Id.
129 See, e.g., SEC v. Shapiro, 349 F. Supp. 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd, 494 F.2d 1301 (2d
Cir. 1974). In Shapiro, the defendants traded on inside information. The Shapiro court
ordered them to disgorge the profits made on such trading with the profits based on the
difference between the price the defendants paid and the price after the information became
public. The court imposed this measure in spite of the fact that the defendants did not sell
at this time, but waited until later when the sale price of the securities had declined from
the high attained immediately after the inside information became public. Thus, the court
made them disgorge the potential profits from insider trading, and not their actual profits.
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the injured purchaser is the consideration he gave for the securities, less
any profits received, plus interest from the date of sale and attorney's
fees.18 0 In addition, civil recovery is a legal issue which a court must sub-
mit to a jury while disgorgement is purely equitable and must be tried to
the court.1 31 Finally, it appears that the running of the statute of limita-
tions under the civil recovery section does not bar SEC disgorgement.
s2
Recently, an excellent decision by an Oklahoma court in Day v.
Southwest Mineral Energy, Inc.,133 reversed the trend against recognizing
the right of state administrators to seek disgorgement under the Uniform
Act. In this case, both the trial and appellate court examined in detail the
federal precedent. Both courts elected to follow this federal precedent
rather than Buckeye Finance and the other state cases rejecting the Ad-
ministrator's authority to seek disgorgement. The Southwest Mineral
opinion is far superior to the earlier state decisions and should provide
strong precedent for other courts to follow.
One final word should be said about injunctive enforcement actions.
Presently, most Administrators are not seeking to recover the costs they
incur in bringing enforcement actions. This is a mistake. As part of the
ancillary relief granted in connection with an injunctive suit, the Admin-
istrator ought to be able to recover his attorney's fees and costs. To date,
the author is aware of only two actions, both uncontested, where the Ad-
ministrator has sought and recovered his costs.1 3 ' Again, with increasing
inflation and the tendency to hold the line on agency budgets, Adminis-
trators should give more consideration to this method of alleviating some
of the costs of litigation.
C. Criminal Enforcement
The last of the enforcement tools available to the Administrator is
criminal prosecution under the Act. Section 409 contains the criminal lia-
bility provisions. That section makes it a felony, punishable -by up to a
$5,000 fine and three years in prison, to willfully violate any provision of
the Act other than section 404. Violation of section 404 which deals with
false filings with the Administrator is also a felony. To obtain a convic-
130 The Shapiro case, see note 129 supra, well illustrates the difference between civil
recovery and disgorgement because that case involved defrauded sellers rather than pur-
chasers. U.S.A. § 410 does not give a cause of action to defrauded purchasers. Therefore,
while the Administrator is able to secure disgorgement for violation of U.S.A. § 101, no
direct civil recovery is possible under U.S.A. § 410.
'31 See SEC v. Wills, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RE'. (CCH) 96,321 (D.D.C.
Feb. 11, 1978).
'" See SEC v. Continental Advisors [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,489 (D.D.C. June 29, 1978).
1 51 OKLA. BAR J. 1911 (Okla. July 23, 1980), aff'g 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 1 71,548
(Okla. Dist. Ct., Okla. County 1979).
13 See Securities Commissioner v. Brenden, 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 1 71,471 (N.D.
Dist. Ct. Dec. 17, 1978); State v. Pacific Mortgage Co., No. 90736 (Ore. Cir. Ct., Marion
County). See also State v. Maryland Cas. Co., 27 Or. App. 735, 557 P.2d 258 (1976).
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tion for a section 404 violation, however, there is an additional require-
ment that the prosecutor establish that the defendant making the false
filing not only did the act willfully, i.e., knew that he was filing something
with the Administrator, but also knowingly in the sense of knowing that
the document or statement was false or misleading."35
Section 409 also makes the violation of any rule or order promulgated
by the Administrator under the Act a felony. The section, however, grants
the defendant a partial affirmative defense in connection with a rule or
order violation. If the defendant commits the violation with knowledge of
the rule or order, then the penalty is the same as for a violation of the Act
itself. If, on the other hand, the defendant is able to establish that he did
not know of the rule or order at the time he acted, then the court may
impose a fine of up to $5000, but there can be no incarceration.1 6
The Uniform Act follows the practice of most statutes creating admin-
istrative agencies and only allows criminal prosecutions by the regularly
appointed or elected law enforcement officials, i.e., the local district attor-
neys or the attorney general.87 As a result, the Administrator or his staff
must refer criminal prosecutions to the appropriate officials. There is a
growing practice in many states, however, for the local prosecutor to rely
upon the expertise of the Administrator or his staff in presenting the
case. The local prosecutor may even appoint the Administrator or an
agency staff member as a special prosecutor to handle the case in its en-
tirety. This practice allows the best of both worlds by giving the local
prosecutor control over the cases which are brought in his jurisdiction,
but making available to him the expertise in securities matters which he
will often lack.
While the violation of any section of the Act can be the basis for the
imposition of criminal liability 8s as a practical matter virtually all crimi-
nal cases will arise from the violation of one of three sections: section 201
for failure to register as either a broker-dealer or agent; section 301 for
failure to register securites offered or sold; or section 101 for the commis-
sion of fraud. It is not unusual for the same transaction to involve the
135 See State v. Woodington, 31 Wis. 2d 151, 142 N.W.2d 810 (1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 9 (1967).
138 See Loss, supra note 12, at 145 (draftsmen's comment to U.S.A. § 409). The drafts-
men's comment to U.S.A. § 409 suggests that the requirement is actual knowledge as op-
posed to constructive knowledge. Constructive knowledge would result from the publication
of the rules and orders in the official state publication organ, i.e., the Oklahoma Gazette in
the'case of Oklahoma. Because many states do not publish their agency rules and orders in
an accessible form such as the Federal Register and Code of Federal Regulations, a con-
structive knowledge requirement is not workable. See People v. Murphy, 11 Cal. Rptr. 295
(Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (involves a violation of the restrictions included in registration order).
137 See U.S.A. § 409(b).
1" See State v. Woodington, 31 Wis. 2d 151, 142 N.W.2d 810 (1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 9 (1967) (U.S.A. § 404 violated by filing false statements with the Administrator); Cur-
tis v. State, 99 Ga. App. 732, 109 S.E.2d 868 (1959), subsequent appeal, 102 Ga. App. 790,
118 S.E.2d 264 (1960)(U.S.A. § 405 violated by representing that Administrator had ap-
proved securities).
[Vol. XXXVII
THE UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT
violation of two or more of these provisions, i.e., the person selling unre-
gistered securities frequently will be unregistered as an agent or broker-
dealer and often will commit fraud in his sales pitch. In such a case, un-
less general criminal law in the jurisdiction prohibits the joining of counts
or the conviction on multiple counts, the prosecutor should allege viola-
tions of each section and have the court submit each violation to the
jury.23 9 It is normally a good trial tactic to couple a violation of the anti-
fraud provisions with any non-registration count where the facts will sup-
port such a charge. This procedure allows the prosecutor a great deal
more leeway as fo the evidence that he can introduce. Further, even if the
jury is not willing to convict on the fraud charge, the evidence may have a
psychological impact on the jury members so that they may be more will-
ing to convict on a non-registration count which the jury may otherwise
treat as merely a technical violation. A separate examination of each of
the three most common violations is helpful in gaining a more complete
understanding of criminal enforcement of the state securities laws.
1. Non-Registration of Securities
Non-registration of securities is a very easy criminal case to prove
under the Uniform Act. First, of course, the prosecution will have to
prove that an offer or sale of the items in question took place. It is impor-
tant to note that the making of an offer for the sale of unregistered secur-
ities is as much a violation of the Act as is the completed sale of such
securities. Normally, the prosecutor can establish the offer or sale of non-
registered securities through the testimony of the victim.
Second, the state will have to prove that the item sold was a security.
There will be no difficulty where the items are of the regular type of se-
curities such as stocks, bonds, or debentures. There may be some diffi-
culty, however, where the items constitute one of the more exotic securi-
ties that fall within the definition of "evidences of indebtedness" or
"investment contract."140 While there appears to be some disagreement in
the cases'141 it seems that the question of whether a security exists in a
139 It is the author's understanding that in Texas, for example, it is possible to allege
the violation of multiple sections of the securities act, but that local law requires the state to
select a single count to submit to the jury for its determination. Oklahoma also has an un-
usual arrangement. Unlike the federal procedure which requires the prosecution to charge
the defendant with all violations known at the time, Oklahoma allows the court to try an
individual on a single count. Thus if X fraudulently sold unregistered securities to Y and Z
and was not registered as an agent, X would go on trial six times. Obviously, the Adminis-
trator and the prosecutor will have to be aware of the local practice and procedure.
140 See Long, Introduction to Student Symposium - Interpreting the Statutory Defini-
tion of a Security: Some Pragmatic Considerations, 6 ST. MARY L. J. 95, 96 (1974) [herein-
after cited as Long, Introduction]; Long, Mainstream, supra note 2.
141 Compare Roe v. United States, 287 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1961); State v. Franks, 262
N.C. 94, 136 S.E.2d 623 (1964); State v. Geary, [1971-1978 Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY L.
REP. (CCH) 1 71,192 (Iowa Dist. Ct. 1975) with United States v. Austin, 462 F.2d 724 (10th
Cir. 1972); Commonwealth v. Queen, 434 S.W.2d 318 (Ky. 1968).
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criminal case is a mixed question of fact and law. As such, the court must
submit the issue to the jury for determination. For example, if the state
claims that the relevant transaction involves an investment contract the
judge must determine which of the several tests for investment contracts
is applicable under local law. 142 The judge would then instruct the jury as
to the elements of the test adopted and leave it to the jury to determine if
there are facts necessary to meet the test. In a civil case, if the court feels
that reasonable people would not differ, the judge can withdraw a fact
question from the jury and rule on it as a matter of law. Such a proce-
dure, however, is not available in a criminal case. A criminal court cannot
withdraw a fact issue, no matter how obvious the answer, from the jury.
To do so would direct a verdict against the defendant.
1 43
The inability of the criminal judge to rule on a factual issue compli-
cates the case from the prosecutor's point of view. The prosecutor would
rather have the judge determine whether a security is involved as a mat-
ter of law. On the other hand, there is one counter-balancing factor. Be-
cause the question of whether there is a security is a question of fact, it
should be permissible to use an expert witness to aid the jury in its deter-
mination of this issue. Obviously, this is the ultimate question of fact for
the jury to decide, but most states now allow expert testimony on the
ultimate question.
The prosecutor should first establish the test the court will adopt and
the elements of this test. It is improper for the expert witness to testify as
to which test the court should adopt because that is clearly a question of
law for the court to determine on the basis of argument of counsel. The
prosecutor should then, through a series of hypothetical questions, estab-
lish the facts of the case. He should then ask the expert witness, in the
hypothetical case, whether there is a security present and why. The latter
part is very important. The bare testimony by an expert that a security is
present, without accompanying analysis of the hypothetical facts and the
relevant test for a security, is worthless, and the trial judge should in-
struct the jury to disregard it. When the expert witness outlines why the
facts present in the case before the jury satisfy the relevant test as de-
fined by the court, his testimony is proper and can be a great deal of help
to the jury. The states of Texas and Alaska have used this technique suc-
cessfully on a number of occasions. The author has served as such an
expert several different times.
The last thing that the prosecution must establish in a criminal non-
registration of securities case is that there was no registration of the se-
curities. This can be done in either of two ways. The Administrator, or
the person in his office who is designated as the custodian of the agency's
141 See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); State v. Hawaii Market Center,
Inc., 52 Haw. 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971). See generally Long, State Securities Regulation -
An Overview, 32 OKLA. L. REv. 541 (1979); Long, Introduction, supra note 140.
143 See, e.g., Roe v. United States 287 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1961); Miller v. State, 285
So.2d 41 (Ga. App. 1973).
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records, may testify that he has searched the records of the agency and
finds no effective registration for the securities in question at the time of
their offer or sale. In the alternative, the prosecution may offer a certifi-
cate from the Administrator to the same effect.
1 4 4
It is important to note what the prosecutor does not have to prove in a
non-registration of securities case. Under the Uniform Act the prosecutor
does not have to prove that the securities were not exempt from registra-
tion. Thus, he does not have to negate the some 25 securities and transac-
tional exemptions in sections 402(a) and (b). Section 401(d) of the Uni-
form Act specifically indicates that the burden of proof shall be upon any
person claiming such exemption. Section 402(d) applies in both civil in-
junctive and criminal cases 145 and does not place an unconstitutional bur-
den on the defendant. 46 The state, of course, still must bear the burden
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on all other elements.
1 47
The prosecution should be aware that there is some question over the
element of intent. The question centers on whether the prosecution must
prove that the defendant knew that he was selling an unregistered secur-
ity in order to convict. The corollary to that is whether the defendant can
escape liability by affirmatively proving that he did not know that the
thing sold was a security or that the law required registration. The prob-
lem centers on the language of section 409 which requires that the viola-
tion of the Act be "willful." A court could interpret this to mean that the
defendant must know that he is selling a security and that the law re-
quires registration of that security.
Most cases under the Uniform Act, however, hold that knowledge is
totally irrelevant. There is a "willful" violation of the Act according to
these decisions, when the act of selling something is a volitional act on
the part of the defendant. The defendant does not need to know that he
is selling a security or that the law requires registration.148 As a result, it
1, Woraley v. State, 162 Ind. App. 34, 317 N.E.2d 908 (1974)(certificate); State v.
Fraks, 262 N.C. 94, 136 S.E.2d 623 (1964)(testimony).
'5 See, e.g., Baldwin v. Oklahoma Sec. Comm. [1971-1978 Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY
L. Rm. 1 71,007 (Okla. App. 1972) (civil injunction); Sessions v. State, 404 P.2d 55 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1965); Buchanan v. State, 171 So. 2d 186 (Fla. App. 1965); Nelson v. State, 355
P.2d 413 (Okla. Crim. App. 1960).
146 See, e.g., State v. Frost, 57 Ohio St.2d 121, 387 N.E.2d 235 (1979); State v.
Buchanan, 361 So.2d 692 (Fla. 1978); People v. Dempster, 51 Mich. App. 612, 216 N.W.2d
81 (1974), rev'd on other grounds, 242 N.W.2d 381 (Mich. 1976). But see State v. Driver, 598
S.W.2d 774 (Tenn. 1980)(holding unconstitutional statute requiring defendant to prove he
did not know or in exercise of reasonable care could not discover material misstatement or
omission in order to avoid criminal fraud liability).
1' See State v. Frost, 57 Ohio St.2d 121, 387 N.E.2d 235 (1979); State v. Goodman, 21
Ariz. App. 252, 517 P.2d 1299, opinion vacated on other grounds, 110 Ariz. 524, 521 P.2d
611 (1974).
, See State v. Hodge, 204 Kan. 98, 460 P.2d 596 (1969); Commonwealth v. Jones, 3
BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 71,550 (C.P. Alleghany County April 24, 1980). People v. Terra-
nova, 563 P.2d 363 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977); State v. Russell, 119 N.J. Super. 344, 291 A.2d 583
(1973).
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is not an affirmative defense to criminal liability to establish that legal
counsel advised the defendant that the items were not securities and did
not require registration. 149 Nor is it a defense that the Administrator ad-
vised the defendant that there need not be registration.1
50
While the issue of intent appears to be clearly settled under the Uni-
form Act, the prosecutor should expect the defense to raise the issue and
he should be prepared to counter it. The federal cases dealing with non-
registration violations are split over the intent question. The Second Cir-
cuit holds that the prosecution must prove intent.'15 The Ninth and
Fourth Circuits, however, hold that proof of intent is unnecessary.'
5
2
There also appears to be two state cases which suggest that knowledge
is an element for the prosecution to prove. In State v. Georgia,'15 the
court first held that the defendant's scheme involved an investment con-
tract. The court then reversed the defendant's criminal conviction be-
cause the decision declaring such schemes to be within the securities law
was decided shortly before the defendant's case and the court could not
charge the defendant with knowledge of it. This case is obviously wrong.
If followed, the promoters of no new scheme are subject to criminal pros-
ecution until after a court in the state declares the scheme to involve a
security. Certainly such a position does not serve the purpose of the se-
curities laws to protect the general public from these types of schemes.
The second case is People v. Dempster,'" which involves the interpre-
tation of the commercial paper exemption. Again, the court held that the
items sold were not within the exemption and that there was a registra-
tion violation. The court, however, then reversed the defendant's convic-
tion. It held that the definition of "commercial paper," as used within the
statutory exemption, was sufficiently vague prior to the court's decision
that the defendant's conviction could not stand.155 These two decisions
149 See State v. Witeaker, 118 Or. 656, 247 P. 1077 (1926); People v. McCalla, 63 Cal.
App. 183, 220 P. 436 (1923); People v. Clem, 39 Cal. App.3d 539, 114 Cal. Rptr. 359 (1974);
People v. Aresen, 91 Cal. App.2d 26, 204 P.2d 389 (1949).
150 See United States v. Anzelmo, 319 F. Supp. 1106 (E.D. La. 1970). But see People v.
Ferguson, 134 Cal. App. 41, 24 P.2d 965 (1933).
"I See United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v.
Crosby, 294 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 984 (1962).
"' See United States v. Brown, 578 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Custer
Channel Wing Corp., 376 F.2d 675 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 850 (1967). See also
United States v. Sussman, 37 F. Supp. 294 (E.D. Pa. 1941); Note, Securities Regulation:
Criminal Liability Under the Oklahoma Securities Act-The Willfulness Requirement, 31
OKLA. L. REv. 486 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Criminal Liability].
153 50 Ohio App. 2d 297, 362 N.E.2d 1223 (1975).
154 396 Mich. 723, 242 N.W.2d 381 (1976).
185 Dempster may well be a case where the prosecutor should have used his discretion
not to prosecute because he felt that the defendant was claiming the exemption in good
faith. The discretion, however, is the prosecutor's and not the court's. Regardless of the
defendant's knowledge, a crime occurred under the statute. As the court indicated in State
v. Burrow, 13 Ariz. App. 130, -, 474 P.2d 849, 851 (1970), violation of the securities act is
essentially a malum prohibitum or malum in se crime.
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seem inconsistent with the idea that knowledge of the statute is
irrelevant.
There is one further problem in the intent area. Many states are be-
ginning to consider the new Model Penal Code. One of the provisions of
this Code provides that a court may not convict a person of a felony with-
out proof of criminal intent unless the statute authorizing such conviction
specifically negates the need for proof of criminal intent. Oregon has
adopted the Model Penal Code and has language in its securities act simi-
lar to section 409. Recently, in State v. Pierre,158 the court held that the
language of the securities act was not sufficiently specific to authorize a
felony conviction for non-registration of securities without criminal in-
tent. Therefore, the court reduced the defendant's conviction to a misde-
meanor. Administrators and prosecutors in those states considering the
Model Code should take steps to see that the securities law is exempt
from this provision. In the alternative there should be an amendment to
the securities law to make clear that intent is not an element of a non-
registration violation.
2. Non-registration as Broker-dealer or Agent
The elements of a criminal case for non-registration as a broker-dealer
or agent will be very similar to those for non-registration of a security.
The prosecutor will have to show that there was an offer or sale. Further,
he will have to show that the item offered or sold is a security. He will
then have to allege and prove that the person charged is either an agent
or a broker-dealer. Section 401(c) defines a "broker-dealer" as "any per-
son engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the
account of others or for his own account." The key here is the words "en-
gaged in the business." While a person may be a broker-dealer where he
is handling nothing but his own transactions, the vast majority of traders
will not be "in the business." Section 401(b) defines an "agent" as "any
individual other than a broker-dealer who represents a broker-dealer or
issuer in effecting or attempting to effect purchases or sales of securities."
In most cases there will be little question that the person is an agent or a
broker-dealer. One's status, however, is a fact question and there is little
case law dealing with the question.
The prosecutor also must establish that the defendant did not regis-
ter. This can be done in the same way as outlined above for showing that
there was no registration of securities. Sections 401(b) and (c) contain
certain exclusions from the definition of "agent" or "broker-dealer."
Again, however, the prosecutor does not have to negate these.157 Section
402(d) covers both exemptions and exclusions from definitions and places
1" 30 Or. App. 81, 566 P.2d 534 (1977).
157 See Hohensee v. State, 42 Md. App. 329, 400 A.2d 455 (1979); State v. Frost, 57
Ohio St. 2d 121, 387 N.E.2d 235 (1979); Worsley v. State, 162 Ind. App. 34, 317 N.E.2d 908
(1974). See also State v. Hayes, 317 So. 2d 764 (Fla. App. 1975) (involving an exemption).
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the burden on the person claiming such exemption or exclusion. " As in
the case of non-registered securities, the prosecutor does not need to show
specific intent to violate the statute. Thus, it is not necessary to show
that the defendant knew that he needed to secure a license before making
the offers or sales.15 9 The prosecution normally will couple violations of
agent or broker-dealer registration provisions with violations of the anti-
fraud or securities registration provisions. 60 The latter, however, is a to-
tally independent ground for criminal liability.'6 '
3. Securities Fraud
The most difficult criminal prosecution under the Uniform Act is that
for securities fraud. This difficulty, in large measure, stems from the fact
that a criminal prosecution for securities fraud requires the reading of
section 409, the criminal liability section, in conjunction with section 101,
the antifraud provision. When a criminal prosecution is sought under sec-
tion 409 of the Uniform Act for violation of section 101, the prosecutor
must show conduct which violates section 101. Second, because the crimi-
nal charge is under section 409 rather than under section 101, the prose-
cution must show that the defendant acted "willfully." Third, the prose-
cutor must prove that the conduct occurred in connection with the offer,
sale, or purchase of a security. Conspicuously absent from the elements of
a criminal prosecution is the need for the prosecutor to show either reli-
ance by the victim or injury to him.
The first element that the prosecutor must prove is that there has
been a violation of the substantive provisions of section 101.162 There are
1" It is not clear whether the language in U.S.A. § 402(d) is also applicable when a
person claims that what he is selling is not a security even though it would clearly fit within
the definition. An example is a promissory note.
2' See State v. Kreminski, 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 71,506 (Conn. June 26, 1979);
State v. Nagel, 279 N.W.2d 911 (S.D. 1979); Commonwealth v. David, 309 N.E.2d 484
(Mass. 1974); State v. Marsh, 428 P.2d 896 (Ore. 1967).
180 See, e.g., State v. Nagel, 279 N.W.2d 911 (S.D. 1979); Commonwealth v. Bomer-
sbach, 393 A.2d 995 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978); Worsley v. State, 162 Ind. App. 34, 317 N.E.2d
908 (1974).
"I See State v. Henderson, 156 N.W.2d 700 (N.D. 1968); State v. Hirsch, 101 Ohio App.
425, 131 N.E.2d 419 (1956). It might be appropriate to bring an action for non-registration
as a broker-dealer or agent independent of a fraud or securities registration violation when a
broker-dealer located outside the state has consistently made offers into the state without
qualifying under the local act. See Long, Conflict, supra note 62.
, U.S.A. § 101 provides:
It is unlawful for any person in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of
any security, directly or indirectly
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud;
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they are made, not misleading; or
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates as a
fraud or deceit upon any person.
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three operative subsections within this section. The first prohibits the
employment of any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud. This language
suggests that the subsection is little more than a codification of the com-
mon law concept of fraud.16 3 As a result, few criminal prosecutions come
under this subsection"" because the prosecutor must prove scienter. Even
with its scienter requirement, 65 however, this subsection presents several
major advantages over its more widely used counterparts, theft by fraud
or obtaining money by fraud or under false pretenses. These latter crimes
clearly require the prosecutor to prove both that the victim parted with
money in reliance upon the fraudulent scheme and that the defendant
intended to defraud.166 The prosecutor need prove neither of these ele-
ments under section 101.
This point was made in the recent case of Van Duyse v. Israel,
167
where the defendant sought a discharge from custody through a writ of
habeas corpus. The defendant was charged in state court with both secur-
ities fraud and theft by fraud. The jury found him innocent of the theft
by fraud charges and guilty of the securities fraud counts. One of the
grounds for his writ was that the jury verdicts were inconsistent. The
court rejected this claim saying:
A verdict is inconsistent when the defendant is charged with two
offenses having identical elements and the jury acquits him of one
offense and convicts him of the other. In order to have convicted
petitioner of theft by fraud, the jury would have had to find that
petitioner obtained property by making false presentations
"made with intent to defraud." § 943.20(1) (d) Wis. Stats. In
order to convict petitioner of fraud in the sale of securities, the
jury was only required to find that his conduct was willful.16 8
14 The conclusion that the first subsection to U.S.A. § 101 is little more than a codifi-
cation of the common law concept of fraud is supported by those courts which require a jury
instruction as to what constitutes a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud. Invariably, the
court borrows these instructions from situations involving common law fraud. See, e.g.,
State v. Homewood, 241 S.C. 231, 128 S.E.2d 98 (1962).
16 See Commonwealth v. Wells, [1971-1978 Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH)
71,387 (Pa. C.P. June 27, 1977); Laveranz v. State, [1971-1978 Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY
L. REP. (CCH) 71,313 (Ga. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 1976); People v. Messer, [1971-1978 Transfer
Binder] BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 1 71,133 (Cal. App. 1973).
145 The scienter requirement in the first subsection of U.S.A. § 101 only means that the
prosecutor must show that the act was knowingly done or done with reckless disregard. It
does not require the showing of an evil mind or intent to defraud.
'"4 See, e.g., State v. Layman, 357 P.2d 1022 (Okla. Crim. App. 1962)(elements of crime
of obtaining money by false pretenses are a false representation of past existing fact, made
by or at the direction of the defendant, with the intent to deceive or defraud, with reliance
by the person who the defendant intended to defraud, and the obtaining of something of
value by the defendant as a result thereof).
117 486 F. Supp. 1382 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
1" Id. at 1387-88. A similar distinction to that in Van Duyse was made in Curtis v.
State, 99 Ga. App. 732, , 109 S.E.2d 868, 872 (1959), subsequent appeal, 102 Ga. App.
790, 118 S.E.2d 264 (1961), where the court said:
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What constitutes a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud is obviously a
question of fact which the court will submit to the jury. The type of
scheme most frequently charged under this provision involves the conver-
sion of investor money to private use. 6 '
One final point should be made about this subsection. There is some
dispute as to whether the charge should encompass the scheme as a whole
or whether the prosecution should allege each offer or sale in connection
with the scheme as a separate offense. In Queen v. Commonwealth,'" the
court concluded that each offer or sale employing the scheme was a sepa-
rate offense.'7 ' A New York trial court, however, recently reached the op-
posite conclusion in People v. Paar."7 The latter court refused to dismiss
several counts when the conduct was alleged as having taken place be-
tween two dates and not identified as having occurred in connection with
any particular offer or sale. The former approach appears to be the better
and safer way to handle the problem. It does, however, result in the de-
fendant having a great deal more criminal liability exposure than might
be thought on first glance.
The second subsection of section 101 prohibits the making of untrue
statements of material fact or the making of material omissions which
make the information conveyed false or inaccurate. This is the subsection
under which the vast majority of criminal securities fraud cases are
brought. 78 While it is often stated, in a short-hand way, that this section
prohibits the making of material misstatements and omissions, this is not
technically true. The subsection does prohibit the making of any mis-
statement. The section, however, only prohibits those omissions which
cause the information conveyed to be either false or misleading. There-
A scheme to defraud is such a scheme as is initiated by the perpetrator with an
intent to defraud another and cause him to suffer a pecuniary loss, but the intent,
not the loss, is the subject matter of the crime. Under Code § 26-7410 [theft by
deceit] it must be shown that the victim has been defrauded as a result thereof.
Under Code § 97-112 [securities fraud] the existence of the scheme, device or arti-
fice, and its use with an intent to defraud [i. e., scienter], regardless of outcome,
constitutes the inhibited act.
See also Queen v. Commonwealth, 434 S.W.2d 318 (Ky. 1968).
"I See Commonwealth v. Wells, [1971-1978 Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH)
71,287 (Pa. C.P. June 27, 1977); Laveranz v. State, [1971-1978 Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY
L. REP. (CCH) 71,313 (Ga. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 1976). See also Queen v. Commonwealth, 434
S.W.2d 318 (Ky. 1968).
170 434 S.W.2d 318 (Ky. 1968). See also United States v. Naftalin, 606 F.2d 809 (8th
Cir. 1979)(reaching the same conclusion under § 17(a) of '34 Act).
2 See State v. Stith, No. 48726 (Minn. April 11, 1980)(each misrepresentation consti-
tutes a separate offense). See also People v. Witzerman, 29 Cal. App.3d 169, 105 Cal. Reptr.
284 (1979)(each misrepresentation constitutes a separate offense in a civil injunction case).
172 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 71,406 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977). See also United States v.
Amick, 439 F.2d 351 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 823 (1971); United States v. Birrell,
266 F.Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
17 See, e.g., State v. Gunnison, No. 2 CA-CR 1700 (Ariz. App. Oct. 24, 1979); State v.
Williams, [1971-1978 Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 71,280 (Wash. Super. Ct.
Apr. 16, 1975), aff'd, 563 P.2d 1220 (Wash. App. 1976).
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fore, as the courts occasionally point out in connection with Rule 10b-5,




Such a distinction, in most cases, is more academic than real because
most omissions will have the effect of making the information given mis-
leading. Thus, the omission of a footnote to a balance sheet disclosing
that the corporation is subject to substantial contingent liabilities is ac-
tionable, not because of the failure to disclose the contingent liabilities,
but because the omission makes the balance sheet an inaccurate picture
of the corporation's financial condition.
Not all misstatements or omissions impose criminal liability. Liability
only results from those misstatements and omissions which are mate-
rial.117 5 Until recently there was a substantial debate as to what should be
the legal definition of "material. 17 6 The Supreme Court settled this de-
bate with their decision in TSC Industries Inc. v. Northway, Inc.17 In
the context of a purchase or sale, the test provides:
[A misstatement or] omitted fact is material if there is a sub-
stantial likelihood that a reasonable [purchaser or seller] would
consider it important in deciding [whether or not to purchase or
sell]... Put another way, there must be a substantial likelihood
that the disclosure of the [misstatement or the] omitted fact
would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having sig-
nificantly altered the "total mix" of the information made
available.
7 8
The state courts have shown the same confusion as the federal courts.1
7 9
'74 See, e.g., Evmar Oil Corp. v. Getty Oil Co., [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 96,358 (C.D. Cal. March 17, 1978).
175 Courts often hold that statements of opinion are not the same as statements of fact
for the purpose of determining materiality. While cases can be found in the securities area
with this same holding, the vast majority of cases recognize that the purpose of the securi-
ties laws is to reverse the concept of caveat emptor so that statements of opinion are action-
able as facts. A similar problem arises with respect to promises made which subsequently
are not kept. As the court pointed out in State v. Brill [1961-1971 Transfer Binder] BLUE
SKY L. REP. (CCH) 70,918 (Wis. Cir. Ct 1971), unfulfilled promises do not rise to the level
of a misstatement of fact unless there is no intent at the time to fulfill them or the defen-
dant has no reasonable grounds upon which he can believe in his ability to perform them. In
Brill, the defendant was held liable where he promised a fixed return when he knew at the
time he accepted the payment that he was insolvent and could not meet his obligations to
repay, much less pay the promised return. See also People v. Carmichael, 106 Cal. App.3d
124, 164 Cal. Rptr. 872 (1980).
17M The debate over the legal definition of "material" centered around whether the pur-
chaser or seller would or merely might consider the misstatement or omission as important.
Compare Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1972)(might) with
Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1974) and Grestle v. Gamble-
Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973)(would).
17 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
178 Id. at 449.
'7 Compare Shermer v. Baker, 2 Wash. App. 33, 472 P.2d 589 (1970)(would) with Peo-
ple v. Cook, 89 Mich. App. 72, 279 N.W.2d 579 (1979)(might). See also Bayne v. Jenkins,
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It is believed, however, that state courts will adopt the TSC Industries
test as they become aware of it.
Within this legal definition it is obviously a question of fact as to
whether, under a particular factual circumstance, something is material.
The test, however, is objective rather than subjective. The question is not
whether this particular purchaser or seller considers the fact material, but
whether the reasonable purchaser or seller would do so. It is obviously
beyond the scope of this article to attempt to outline all of the bits of
information that are material.180 Two examples, however, might be useful.
In State v. Williams,'18 the court, sitting without a jury, found it ma-
terial that the defendant did not reveal that he had sold fractional inter-
ests in the patent he was marketing in an amount exceeding 100 percent.
The fractional interests were the securities. Further, the court held mate-
rial his misstatements concerning when he was going to begin production
under the patent and that the Weyerhauser Corporation and the Wash-
ington State Patrol had placed an order for goods manufactured under
the patent. In State v. Rutherford,'s2 the court held that the failure to
disclose the issuance of a stop order by the Washington Securities Com-
mission against further sale of the securities was a material omission.
The Administrator and prosecutor should be alert to two other things
which courts have held to be material. First, the failure to disclose a pre-
vious conviction or injunction in connection with the sale of securities or
in a related field, i.e., consumer protection, is a material omission. 8 3 Sec-
ond, it is a material omission to fail to disclose that the securities sold
were unregistered under either the state or federal securities act, if there
is a requirement of registration.' The significance of this latter point is
two-fold. First, it allows the charging of a non-registration violation in the
alternative as an antifraud violation. Second, it allows a court to try a
violation of the federal securites act as a violation of the state securities
act antifraud provisions.
The third subsection of section 101 prohibits any act, practice, or
course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit.'"
593 S.W.2d 519 (Mo. 1980); Gerber Prod. Co. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 76 Mich. App.
410, 256 N.W.2d 754 (1977).
180 See 1 A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE 10b-5 (3 Clark Bondman Securities Series) 3-
94-3-119 (rev. ed. 1977)(list of items which plaintiffs allege to be material under Rule 10b-5).
181 [1971-1978 Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 1 71,280 (Wash. Super. 1975),
aff'd, 563 P.2d 1220 (Wash. App. 1976).
182 166 Wash. 837, 405 P.2d 719 (1965).
183 See Securities Commissioner v. McGovern, 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) T 71,438
(N.D. Dist. Ct May 30, 1978).
18 See, e.g., SEC v. Pearson, 426 F.2d 1339 (10th Cir. 1970); Securities Commissioner v.
McGovern, 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 1 71,438 (N.D. Dist. Ct. May 30, 1978); Levan v.
Legarra, No. 542,309, Los Angeles Daily Journal, p. 1, col. 1 (Cal. Super Ct. Dec. 23, 1949).
188 The third subsection of U.S.A. § 101 prevents fraud or deceit on any person. Thus,
while in the vast majority of cases the fraud or deceit will be on the person to whom the
defendant makes the offer or sale, such does not have to be the case. In Curtis v. State, 102
Ga. App. 790, 118 S.E.2d 264 (1960), the court pointed this out and indicated that the fraud
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The major difference between this subsection and subsection one, dis-
cussed above, appears to be its focus. Subsection one focuses on the in-
tent or state of mind of the defendant. Subsection three appears to focus
on the effect of the conduct upon the victim rather than the state of mind
with which the defendant does the act. A number of courts recognize this
distinction under section 17(a) of the '33 Act.186
The second requirement for a criminal antifraud prosecution requires
the violation of section 101 to be "willfully" done. This requirement
raises what is believed to be the single most perplexing problem in con-
nection with securities fraud prosecutions. What does "willfully" mean in
this context? Does it mean that the act has to be done with scienter? Or
does it mean merely that the act has to be a volitional act on the part of
the defendant without regard to the state of mind giving rise to the doing
of the act?
As noted at the beginning of this section, the "willfulness" require-
ment stems not from section 101, but rather from section 409. A reading
of section 409 reveals that the same language, including the requirement
that the violation be "willful," governs both the non-registration viola-
tions under sections 201 and 301, discussed in the previous two sections,
as well as those violations of the antifraud provisions of section 101. It
therefore seems reasonable to interpret the "willfulness" requirement in
the same manner under both contexts.18 7 As noted in the previous sec-
tions, the overwhelming weight of authority holds that "willfulness" in
the non-registration context means only that the person charged engage
in a volitional, as opposed to a coerced, act without regard to whether he
realizes that such conduct is in violation of the registration requirements.
Applying this standard to the antifraud violations, it means that the de-
fendant is liable if he voluntarily engages in conduct which violates sec-
tion 101 without regard to his understanding that his conduct violates
that section.
Unfortunately, the court decisions at both the state and federal level
are in total confusion. Some federal cases hold that mere negligent or
reckless conduct is sufficient to impose liability. 88 Others require proof of
was not only perpetrated on the securities purchasers, but also upon the existing
sharholders of the corporation. More recently, in Reid v. Madison, 438 F. Supp. 332 (E.D.
Va. 1977), the court allowed a non-purchaser to maintain an action under § 17(a) of the '33
Act for civil recovery. In In re Daniel S. Brier & Co. [1961-1971 Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY
L. REP. (CCH) 70,917 (N.J. Sec. Bir. 1970), the New Jersey Administrator took the novel
position that the fraud could be perpetrated on the securities commission.
186 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976). See, e.g., Aaron v. SEC, 100 S. Ct. 1945 (1980); SEC v.
Blazon Corp., 609 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1979); SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1978). In
Coven, the court stated that subsection three of § 17(a) focuses "attention on the effect of
potentially misleading conduct on the public, not on the culpability of the person responsi-
ble." 581 F.2d at 1026 (emphasis in original).
'8 See, e.g., People v. Terranova, 563 P.2d 363 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977); State v. Cox, 17
Wash. App. 896, 566 P.2d 935 (1977); Commonwealth v. Jones, 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH)
71,550 (Pa. C.P. 1980).
1" See, e.g., United States v. Meyer, 359 F.2d 837 (7th Cir. 1966); United States v.
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knowing conduct in the sense that the defendant know that the state-
ments made were either false or did not tell the entire story.89 The ma-
jority of state cases appear to follow this latter position.190
The confusion stems from the failure of the courts to properly distin-
guish between the "willfulness" requirement of section 409 and the sub-
stantive provisions of section 101. The "willfulness" requirement, in the
antifraud context, should not require proof that the violation of section
101 was both "willful and knowing."'19 Rather, "willfulness" should have
the same interpretation as in the non-registration context and merely re-
quire the act or conduct to be violational rather than coerced. 92 Such an
interpretation, however, does not mean that a criminal conviction will au-
tomatically follow without proof of scienter. It simply means that the
"willfulness" requirement of section 409 does not impose such a require-
ment. There must be an examination of the substantive provisions of sec-
tion 101 to see whether they include such a scienter requirement.
As noted earlier in discussing civil injunctions under section 101,193
there is a growing difference of opinion on this point. It appears, however,
Schaefer, 299 F.2d 625 (7th Cir. 1962); Stone v. United States, 113 F.2d 70 (6th Cir. 1940).
See also Annot., 20 A.L.R. Fed. (1974) (general discussion of federal cases).
189 See, e.g., United States v. Charnay, 537 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1976); Elbel v. United
States, 364 F.2d 127 (10th Cir. 1966); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Supp. 1221 (D. Conn.
1969). One of the things which causes confusion in the federal cases is the fact that securi-
ties fraud is often charged along with mail or wire fraud. There is no question that a convic-
tion requires proof of scienter under the mall fraud statute. Therefore, the courts tend to
treat the two statutes together and impose the higher requirements of the mail fraud stat-
ute. See State v. Cox, 17 Wash. App. 896, 566 P.2d 935 (1977)(illustrates the distinction
between the two statutes).
19 See, e.g., Van Antwerp v. State, 358 So.2d 782 (Ala. App. 1978); People v. Blair, 195
Colo. 462, 579 P.2d 1133 (1978); State v. Hynds, 84 Wash.2d 657, 529 P.2d 829 (1974); Peo-
ple v. Cook, 89 Mich. App. 72, 279 N.W.2d 579 (1979). The author has only found two cases
which reach a contrary position. See State v. Gunnison, No. 2 CA-CR 1700 (Ariz. App. Oct.
24, 1979); People v. Barysh, 3 BLUE SKY L. RsP. (CCH) 71,431 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. August
1978). See also Criminal Liability, supra note 152.
1" Some courts do hold that in the antifraud context, the willfulness requirement re-
quires proof that the violation was both knowing and willful. See, e.g., People v. Blair, 195
Colo. 462, 579 P.2d 1133 (1978); State v. Hynds, 84 Wash.2d 657, 529 P.2d 829 (1974);
People v. Cook, 89 Mich. App. 72, 279 N.W.2d 579 (1979).
' The official comments to U.S.A. § 409, see Loss, supra note 12, at 144, on the "will-
fulness" issue, refer to their comment under U.S.A. § 204(a)(2)(B). That comment reads:
As the federal courts and the SEC have construed the term "willfully" in § 15(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(b), all that is required is
proof that the person acted intentionally in the sense that he was aware of what
he was doing. Proof of evil motive or intent to violate the law, or knowledge that
the law was being violated, is not required.
Id. at 29. This comment was quoted in People v. Blair, 195 Colo. 462, 579 P.2d 113, 118
(1978), as support for the conclusion that willfulness means knowing. This holding is incor-
rect. All that U.S.A. § 101(2) requires is that the person know that he is making a statement
and that this statement is voluntarily made. This comment makes crystal clear that intent
to deceive or defraud is not an element. See State v. Gunnison, No. 2-CA-CR 1700 (Ari.
App. Oct. 24, 1979). But see State v. Hynds, 84 Wash.2d 657, 529 P.2d 829 (1974)(dicta).
191 See text accompanying notes 81-114 supra.
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that the majority hold that scienter, in the sense of knowing conduct,1 ' is
not a requirement under subsections (2) or (3) of either section 17(a) of
the '33 Act 95 or section 101 of the Uniform Act.196 There was a recent
application of this idea to criminal prosecutions under the Arizona
equivalent of section 101(2) in State v. Gunnison.197 The court, after re-
viewing federal developments rejecting the application of Ernst &
Ernst'9 s to section 17(a) of the '33 Act, concluded that the rationale of
Ernst & Ernst had no application under the Arizona state law. The court
then concluded that violation of the statute was a malum prohibitum of-
fense for which there is no requirement of knowledge. The court cited
earlier cases reaching a similar conclusion under the registration
provisions. 99
More recently, in Van Duyse v. Israel,"'" the court held that the pros-
ecution need not prove scienter in an action brought under section 101(3).
The defendant was convicted in a state court jury trial of violating sec-
tion 101(3) of the Wisconsin Securities Act. He sought a writ of habeas
corpus from the federal district court on the ground, inter alia, that the
evidence was not sufficient to support his conviction because he claimed
that the state had to prove that he engaged in the prohibited conduct
with scienter. The court rejected Van Duyse's contention saying:
While the Wisconsin courts have not addressed the intent
question, the language of the statutory provisions at issue sup-
ports the state's interpretation. Section 551.41(3) speaks of con-
duct which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon
I" The lower federal courts do not interpret Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185
(1976), to require intent to deceive or cause injury and have extended the concept of know-
ing conduct to embrace reckless conduct as well. See, e.g., Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co.,
554 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1977); Sunstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir.
1977).
190 See, e.g., Aaron v. SEC, 100 S.Ct. 1945 (1980); SEC v. Blazon Corp. 609 F.2d 960
(9th Cir. 1979); SEC v. American Realty Trust, 586 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1978); SEC v. Coven,
581 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1978).
I See Kittilson v. Ford, 93 Wash. 223, 608 P.2d 264 (1980). See, e.g., State v. Gunni-
son, No. 2 CA-CR 1700 (Ariz. App. Oct. 24, 1979).
'- No. 2 CA-CR 1700 (Ariz. App. Oct. 24, 1979). It appears that State v. Cox, 17 Wash.
App. 896, 566 P.2d 935 (1977), is consistent with the Gunnison decision. In the Cox case,
however, the court talks in terms of subsection two not requiring intent to deceive. There-
fore, it is not clear whether the court is merely saying that the prosecution does not have to
show that the defendant intended to deceive the victim or cause him injury or whether it is
taking the position that subsection two does not require the act to be knowingly done in the
sense of knowing that the statement is false or misleading. The court does say that the
making of an untrue statement is sufficient for a violation. Id. at , 566 P.2d at 939. This
statement suggests that the latter interpretation is correct. This is consistent with the posi-
tion subsequently taken by the Washington Supreme Court in Kittilson v. Ford, 93 Wash.
2d 223, 608 P.2d 264 (1980).
19 425 U.S. 185 (1976); see Aaron v. SEC, 100 S.Ct. 1945 (1980).
'" See State v. Russell, 119 N.J. Super. 344, 291 A.2d 583 (1972); State v. Burrows, 13
Ariz. App. 130, 474 P.2d 849 (1970).
200 486 F. Supp. 1382 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
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any person. Section 551.58 imposes criminal liability on any per-
son who "wilfully" violates any provision of the act. Taken to-
gether, the plain meaning of the statutory provisions indicates
that the State need only prove that the accused wilfully engaged
in conduct which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon any person. It is the nature of the act which is dispositive,
not the state of mind of the actor. In this sense, the statute im-
poses a form of strict liability. Once the seller has wilfully en-
gaged in conduct which operates or would operate as a fraud or
deceit, he will not be heard to argue that he did not intend the
consequences of his acts.
Accordingly, the State was only required to prove that peti-
tioner wilfully engaged in the type of conduct prohibited by the
act.
201
The Gunnison and Van Duyse cases are correct. Adoption of the ra-
tionale used in these cases will go a long way to alleviate the present con-
fusion in the prosecution of securities fraud cases and will harmonize the
results, if not the reasoning, of the outstanding cases. If courts adopt the
rationale of the Gunnison and Van Duyse decisions prosecutions under
section 101(1) will continue to require the proof of scienter, but prosecu-
tions under either section 101(2) or (3) will not.2 0 2 The major impact of
the two decisions on state securities fraud prosecutions results from the
fact that present case law shows that prosecutors bring more cases under
subsections (2) and (3) than under subsection (1)20
3
The final requirement for a criminal fraud prosecution is that the sub-
stantive violation of section 101 take place "in connection with the offer,
sale, or purchase of a security." Quite obviously, the prosecutor is going to
have to establish that what the defendant offered, sold, or puchased was a
security.20 ' The same basic standards apply here as in a prosecution for
the non-registration violations. The defendant does not need to know
1o' Id. at 1387 (emphasis in original).
202 That the prosecution must prove scienter under U.S.A. § 101(1) but not under
U.S.A. 101(2) and (3) finds confirmation in Aaron v. SEC, 100 S.Ct. 1945 (1980), where the
Supreme Court reached the same holding under § 17(a).
203 See, e.g., Boggess v. Commonwealth, 447 S.W. 2d 88 (Ky. 1969)(subsection three
only); State v. Gunnison, No. 2 CA-CR 1700 (Ariz. App. Oct. 24, 1979); People v. Cook, 89
Mich. App. 72, 279 N.W.2d 579 (1979)(both subsections two and three); People v. Blair, 195
Colo. 462, 579 P.2d 1663 (Colo. App. 1977); State v. Williams, [1971-1978 Transfer Binder]
BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 71,280 (Wash. Super. Ct. April 16, 1975), aff'd, 563 P.2d 1220
(1976)(subsection two only). In many cases, the charges appear to be generally under U.S.A.
§ 101 without attempting to specify any particular subsection. See, e.g., Queen v. Common-
wealth, 434 S.W.2d 318 (Ky. 1968); People v. Terranova, 563 P.2d 363 (Colo. App. 1977);
State v. Hynds, 84 Wash. App.2d 675, 529 P.2d 829 (1974). If courts adopt the Gunnison
and Van Duyse rule, the prosecutor should not bring a general charge as he will then have
to prove the most stringent requirement imposed. This means proving scienter since subsec-
tion one requires such proof.
204 See, e.g., State v. Brewer, 26 Ariz. App. 408, 549 P.2d 188 (1976).
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that what he is selling through fraud or misrepresentation is a security;203
nor is the advise of counsel or of the securities officials a defense. Thus, as
was made clear in United States v. Brown2 0 whatever the scienter stan-
dard the prosecution must establish to show a substantive violation of
section 101, no scienter standard carries over into this branch of the case.
Second, the prosecutor also must show, as in the non-registration vio-
lations, that there was an offer, sale, or purchase of these securities. Little
need be said about this requirement other than to remind the reader of
the broad definition of these terms found in the Uniform Act.20 7 There
are many cases which discuss the concepts of offer, purchase, and sale in
conjunction with both section 17(a) of the '33 Act and Rule 10b-5. By and
large these cases are equally applicable under the Uniform Act with the
notable exception of those items excluded from the definition by the
Uniform Act. Section 401(j)(6) of the Uniform Act excludes from the
definition of sale bona fide pledges or loans, stock dividends, mergers,
consolidations, and reclassifications,' 0  and a judicially approved
reorganization.20 9
The major problem is in determining whether the fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation took place "in connection with" the offer, sale or
purchase of the securities. In the simple case this requirement may pose
no problem because there will be a direct link between the conduct and
the offer, sale, or purchase. In the more difficult cases, however, especially
those involving corporate mismanagement, the connection between the
two may be less obvious. Nevertheless, these latter cases should not go
205 See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 578 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1978).
06 578 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1978).
20 See U.S.A. § 401G).
205 The mergers, consolidations, and reclassifications excluded from the definition of
sale by U.S.A. § 4010)(6) must take place pursuant to a class vote, and the controlling
corporate statute or the corporation's articles of incorporation must require this class vote.
If there is no required vote, but it is voluntarily taken or the shareholders are individually
approached, then the exclusion does not apply. Further, Type B reorganizations under the
Internal Revenue Code, see LR.C. § 368 (a)(1)(B), involving a stock for stock exchange
where both corporations continue to exist, one merely becoming the subsidiary of the other,
are not covered even though a vote is taken pursuant to the controlling statute or articles of
incorporation. Such a reorganization is simply not a merger, consolidation, or reclassification
as these terms are traditionally defined. See, e.g., Heard v. Savage, [1979 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,787 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 12, 1978); Dyer v. Eastern Trust and
Banking Co., 336 F. Supp. 890 (D. Me. 1971); Emmi v. First-Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 336
F.Supp. 629 (D. Me. 1971). Such reorganizations are currently very popular in connection
with the organization of bank and insurance holding companies. Banking and insurance cor-
poration statutes often authorize such reorganizations.
255 Since U.S.A. § 401(j)(6) excludes certain transactions from the definition of sale, the
antifraud, as well as the registration provisions, do not apply. Because this creates an obvi-
ous gap in the antifraud coverage of the statute, many states alter the Uniform Act to make
these exclusions merely exemptions from the registration requirements. See, e.g., ALA. CODE
tit. 8, § 8-6-11(a)(13) & (14) (1975); KIm. STAT. § 17-1262(k) & (1) (supp. 1979). The defen-
dant has the burden of proving that he comes within any of these exclusions. See also
U.S.A. § 402 (d) (covering both claims to exemptions and exclusions from definition).
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unprosecuted.
Again, because there is little guidance under the Uniform Act, there
must be reference to the experience under the federal acts. The federal
courts originally took a rather narrow view of whether something oc-
curred in connection with an offer or sale.21 0 The Supreme Court has re-
jected this narrow interpretation.211 As a result, the lower federal courts
have adopted a much broader "nexus" test for defining "in connection
with." The Fifth Circuit recently summarized this test as follows:
The "in connection with" requirement of Rule 10b-5 is flexibly
applied to require that there be a nexus between the defendant's
fraud and the plaintiff's sale of securities. The plaintiff in a Rule
10b-5 case need not establish a direct or close relationship be-
tween the fraudulent transaction and the purchase or sale, but
only that the transaction involving the sale "touch" the transac-
tion involving the defendant's fraud. This Court has held that the
"in connection with" test of Superintendent of Insurance" is sat-
isfied where the prescribed conduct and the sale are part of the
same fraudulent scheme.
2 2
The nexus test obviously gives the prosecutor very wide latitude in
attempting to connect the alleged fraud or misrepresentation with some
offer, sale, or purchase of a security. There clearly are some limitations,
however, on this latitude. The courts hold that conduct which takes place
at a time before and remote from the present transaction will not qual-
ify.2 1 3 This becomes very important when assessing the liability of profes-
sionals such as lawyers and accountants who render professional opinions.
The watershed of liability for these people appears to be whether they
can reasonably foresee the use of their opinions in connection with the
sale." If use is foreseeable, their actions are covered by section 101. The
courts also hold that conduct which takes place after the purchase or sale,
and which is not a part of a continuing scheme to defraud, is not cov-
ered.2 15 Finally, the courts hold that the "in connection with" require-
ment excludes those cases where the conduct leads the victim to retain
his securities rather than sell them.2 1 6 The basis of the latter holding is
210 See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 300 F. Supp. 1083,
1101-1102 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), rev'd, 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
See Superintendent of Ins. v. Banker Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12-13 (1971).
21 Alley v. Miramon, 614 F.2d 1372, 1378 n.11 (5th Cir. 1980).
Compare Darrell v. Goodson, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
97,349 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 1980)(conduct held too remote) with Horst v. W.T. Cabe & Co.,
[1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 96,213 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 1977)(con-
duct during pendency of executory contract held to be in connection with transaction).
2 See Competitive Associates, Inc. v. Howath & Howath, 516 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1975);
Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 96,612
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 1978).
*15 See, e.g., Wittenberg v. Continental Real Estate Partners, Ltd. 478 F. Supp. 504 (D.
Mass 1979).
216 See, e.g., Troyer v. Karcagi, 476 F. Supp. 1142 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). U.S.A. § 101, how-
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that Rule 10b-5 covers only purchases and sales of securities. Section 101
and section 17(a) of the '33 Act, however, also cover "offers."
Conclusion
As can be seen from the foregoing discussion there are many ques-
tions, but as yet few answers, concerning the administrative, injunctive,
and penal provisions of the Uniform Securities Act. Yet, because of the
increased activity and interest in state securities laws, there is a desperate
need for some guidance in these areas for the securities administrators
and their staffs, the prosecutors who must enforce the Act, and the prac-
ticing bar that must deal with the Act. This article attempts to provide
some aid toward this end. The article is not a substitute for in-depth re-
search by the person facing a particular problem. Rather, it is an attempt
to give the reader a broad overview of the Act and its provisions, to out-
line some of the obvious questions raised by the provisions, and to answer
those questions to the best of the author's ability based upon the case
law, state and federal, presently available.
ever, unlike Rule 10b-5, covers violations that cause the victim to reject an offer that he
might otherwise accept. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
The relatively narrow scope of Rule 10b-5 results from the fact that it only encompasses
purchases and sales of securities while U.S.A. § 101 and § 17(a) of the '33 Act both cover
"offers."
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